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For the last two centuries, individual states and U.S. terri-
tories have been entrusted with primary responsibility for reg-
ulating property, casualty, and life insurance markets.1 Under 
this system, each jurisdiction has its own insurance regulator 
and set of insurance laws. Turf battles among these fifty-six in-
surance jurisdictions are rare, as they each enjoy exclusive au-
thority over any insurance business that takes place within 
 
 1. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-
Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 20–26 (1993) (outlining the broad scope of state regula-
tion of insurance in the context of the McCarran Ferguson Act’s “business of 
insurance” exception); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United 
States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629–34 (1999) (discussing the de-
velopment of state regulation of insurance). 
  
2010] AGAINST REGULATORY COMPETITION 1709 
 
their physical boundaries.2 As a result, their relationship is 
characterized much more by cooperation than competition.3 
To its critics, this patchwork approach to insurance regula-
tion is antiquated and inefficient.4 It requires multistate insur-
ers to conform their practices to different regulatory regimes in 
different states,5 inhibits cooperation between American and 
international insurance regulators,6 and allows state politics to 
dictate counterproductive regulatory strategies.7 Given this 
nonexhaustive litany of complaints about state insurance regu-
lation, it is hardly surprising that insurance regulatory reform 
 
 2. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 112–13 
(3d ed. 2007) (“[E]ach state separately regulates the business of insurance.”). 
 3. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for 
Insurance Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953, 984 (2009) (“Traditionally, 
states have operated their insurance commissions as regulatory monopolies 
and have not engaged in regulatory competition, which exists to some degree 
between state and federal government agencies that issue bank charters, and 
among states for the incorporation of businesses.”). 
 4. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Single-License Solution, 
REG., Winter 2008, at 36, 36–38. See generally OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER-
ING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2000) 
(documenting the history of insurance regulation and the implications for an 
optional federal charter); THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 13–51, 117–43 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009) 
(outlining the history of insurance regulation and explaining why reform is 
necessary). 
 5. See Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, Efficiency Implications of Al-
ternative Regulatory Structures for Insurance, in OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHAR-
TERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 79, 109–
11. See generally Robert W. Klein, The Insurance Industry and Its Regulation: 
An Overview, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 4, at 13, 31–42 [hereinafter Klein, Overview] (outlining the 
current framework of state insurance regulation). Not only does this produce 
costs for the industry, but it also creates inefficiencies in the regulatory 
process itself, as states free-ride off of each other when it comes to regulating 
multistate insurers. See Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, The Allocation 
of Governmental Regulatory Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance 
Regulation, 74 J. RISK & INS. 207, 235 (2007). 
 6. See Brown, supra note 3, at 972, 987–88 (noting that the lack of insur-
ance uniformity in the United States inhibits adoption of international insur-
ance standards and makes it difficult to conduct negotiations for such stan-
dards). 
 7. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 38 (noting that large, lucrative 
states can impose inefficiencies into the market); J. David Cummins et al., 
Regulation, Political Influence and the Price of Automobile Insurance, 20 J. 
INS. REG. 9, 43–44 (2001) (using statistics to show that politics can negatively 
influence car insurance prices); Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, An Optional 
Federal Charter for Insurance: Rationale and Design, in THE FUTURE OF IN-
SURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at 55, 59 (noting 
that states will regulate in a way most salient to their voters). 
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has received renewed attention in the wake of the global finan-
cial panic of 2008 and the federal bailout of American Interna-
tional Group (AIG).8  
One of the central ideas to emerge out of this public debate 
is that the relationship among insurance regulators should be 
inverted, so that different regulators are pitted against one 
another in competition rather than joined together in coopera-
tion.9 Two prominent reform proposals would implement such 
regulatory competition by permitting individual insurers to se-
lect a single jurisdiction’s regulatory scheme, irrespective of 
where that insurer sells coverage or conducts its operations. In 
the first proposal, known as the Optional Federal Charter 
(OFC), this choice would be binary: insurers would be permit-
ted to opt-out of the current state-based regulatory regime in 
 
 8. See, e.g., Mark A. Hofmann, Trade Groups Applaud Fed Action on 
AIG, BUS. INS., Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/ 
article/20080917/NEWS/200013972 (reporting a statement from Marc Racicot, 
president of the American Insurance Association, arguing that the AIG situa-
tion highlights the need for insurance regulatory reform); Tom Wilson, Op-Ed, 
Regulate Me, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A29 (calling for federal 
reform of regulation in light of AIG’s collapse). Additionally, congressional 
committees have held numerous hearings in the last year on insurance regula-
tory reform in light of AIG’s collapse. See, e.g., Perspectives on Modernizing 
Insurance Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009); The Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th 
Cong. (2008).  
 9. In the last year, various commentators have advocated for enhanced 
regulatory competition in insurance. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, 
at 39–41; Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 57; Mark E. Ruquet, Forbes Says In-
surers Should Have Their Choice of Regulator, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, May 25, 
2009, at 10, 10 (arguing that insurers and consumers should have the right to 
choose who regulates them); Scott Harrington, Federal Chartering of Insur-
ance Companies: Options and Alternatives for Transforming Insurance Regula-
tion 22–23 (Networks Fin. Inst., Policy Brief No. 2006-PB-02, 2006), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923605 (highlighting the 
benefits of an optional federal charter); Sharon Tennyson, State Regulation and 
Consumer Protection in the Insurance Industry 21 (Networks Fin. Inst., Policy 
Brief No. 2008-PB-03, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1106172 (arguing that regulatory competition—in the form 
of the threat of federal preemption—“has spurred efficiency enhancing 
changes in state market conduct regulation, as economic theory would pre-
dict”). Others have strongly resisted such regulatory competition. See Insur-
ance Industry Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of J. Robert Hunter, Direc-
tor of Insurance, Consumer Federation of America) (urging Congress to reject 
the optional federal charter); Editorial, Regulator Shopping, N.Y. TIMES, May 
21, 2009, at A34. 
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favor of a newly created federal scheme.10 Fundamentally, this 
proposal would replicate the dual banking system, which per-
mits banks to acquire a charter at either the state or federal 
level.11 The second proposal, dubbed the Single-License Solu-
tion (SLS), imagines more wide-ranging competition among dif-
ferent insurance regulators, whereby insurers would be empow-
ered to select any state regulator to govern all of their 
insurance operations across the country.12 It thus emulates the 
system of corporate chartering, which permits corporations to 
incorporate in any of the fifty states irrespective of their prin-
cipal place of business.13  
In one sense, this renewed enthusiasm for regulatory com-
petition in insurance is ironic, as many blame similar forms of 
regulatory competition for contributing to the global financial 
panic of 2008.14 In the banking realm, for instance, allowing 
banks to “shop” among competing regulators at the state and 
federal level may have induced those regulators to consciously 
ignore widespread predatory lending and overlook the immense 
risks borne by individual banks.15 Similarly, regulatory compe-
tition in corporate law may arguably have contributed to the 
executive compensation schemes that incentivized firms to fo-
 
 10. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 57; Harrington, supra note 9, at 
22. See generally OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF IN-
SURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 4 (outlining arguments for and against the 
OFC). 
 11. See Robert Detlefsen, Dual Insurance Chartering: Potential Conse-
quences, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 4, at 97, 98. 
 12. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 39–42 (enumerating the costs 
and benefits of such a regulatory system); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Rib-
stein, A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance 14–15 (Nw. Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-10; Univ. of Ill., Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. LE08-015, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1134792 [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, Regulating Insurance]; Harrington, 
supra note 9, at 28–29. 
 13. See Harrington, supra note 9, at 28–29 (explaining that this approach 
“has its roots in corporate law, where corporations choose a state in which to 
be chartered”). 
 14. See Regulator Shopping, supra note 9. 
 15. See, e.g., Consumer Protections in Financial Services: Past Problems, 
Future Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs, 111th Cong. 62–63 (2009) (prepared statement of Patricia A. 
McCoy, Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law). But see Todd J. 
Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009) (arguing that regulations should not “unduly 
disrupt the market for legitimate subprime loans” because “only a minority of 
subprime loans could be considered ‘predatory’”). 
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cus too much on short-term profits and too little on long-term 
risks.16  
At the same time, regulatory competition can indeed gen-
erate substantial benefits depending on the context in which it 
is deployed and the way in which it is structured.17 In certain 
situations, regulatory competition may provide an appropriate 
“safety valve” against excessive regulation, motivate regulators 
to design efficient and responsive regimes, and provide regula-
tion that matches the legitimate needs of different types of reg-
ulated entities.18 Indeed, many (if not most) corporate law scho-
lars endorse jurisdictional competition, and the dual chartering 
system in banking is so revered that none of the serious pro-
posals to modernize banking regulation would upset it.19  
As such, this Article explores the case for promoting com-
petition among regulators of life, property, and casualty insur-
ance markets.20 It focuses on the key argument for promoting 
 
 16. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 184–85 (2004) (ar-
guing that executives with options are incentivized to drive up short-term 
share value at the expense of long-term value); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, 
Avoiding “Short-Term Capital Management”: Can Better Corporate Gover-
nance Prevent Future Crises? (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
Of course, this point is quite speculative, and others resist both the notion that 
executive pay is primarily responsible for creating excessive risk taking and 
the notion that it is excessive from the standpoint of shareholder value. See 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1615, 1629–30 (2005) (book review) (criticizing Pay Without Performance, 
noting that strong evidence suggests that executive compensation packages 
are designed to align managerial and shareholder interests); John E. Core et 
al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1172–77 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra); cf. 
Nathan Knutt, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal 
Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 495, 500–06 (2005) (arguing that government 
regulation of executive compensation is generally ineffective and that compa-
nies should self-regulate in this area). 
 17. See generally Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Introduction, in 
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES, at xix, xxiii–xxxi (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) 
(introducing the concept of regulatory competition and outlining various costs 
and benefits).  
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. See infra Part I.B.  
 20. See generally M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives are Not “Insur-
ance” (Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 
476, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1440945 (arguing that credit derivatives are not insurance and should not be 
governed as insurance). With respect to health insurance, regulatory reform is 
currently proceeding independently of other forms of insurance reform, in 
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regulatory competition: that it can improve the substance of in-
surance regulation by harnessing the power of markets.21 This 
Article concludes that regulatory competition cannot be de-
fended on this basis in the context of property, casualty, and 
life insurance markets. Rather than promote optimal regula-
tion, regulatory competition would inevitably tend to promote 
deregulation irrespective of its desirability.22 Ultimately, such 
deregulation would prove undesirable, even in the small doses 
that might be induced by limited regulatory competition such 
as that imagined in the OFC. It would tend to exacerbate exist-
ing problems with the political economy of insurance regulation 
and impede the development of effective regulatory innova-
tion.23 
By focusing on regulatory competition’s impact on the sub-
stance of insurance regulation, this Article deliberately side-
steps several important issues that are relevant to any discus-
sion of reforming insurance regulation.24 First, and most 
importantly, it does not address the fact that both the SLS and 
OFC proposals would eliminate the need for multistate insur-
ers to comply with multiple regulatory regimes.25 Although this 
 
large part because health insurance is fundamentally intertwined with health 
care in the United States, and health care is a central policy issue.  
 21. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 16, 26 
(2009). 
 22. But see id. (arguing that regulatory competition is desirable because it 
promotes optimal outcomes, irrespective of whether efficiency requires more or 
less regulation). 
 23. Others have also suggested that regulatory competition might pro-
mote a race to the bottom in insurance, though they have not analyzed this 
prospect extensively. See Lissa Lamkin Broome, A Federal Charter Option for 
Insurance Companies: Lessons from the Bank Experience, in FINANCIAL MOD-
ERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY 203, 219–23 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., 
2002) (highlighting the risk that an OFC might promote a race to the bottom 
by analogizing the OFC to the banking industry); Elizabeth F. Brown, The 
Fatal Flaw of Proposals to Federalize Insurance 39 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. 
of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 07-25, 2007), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1008993 (mentioning that regulatory competition in insur-
ance might promote a race to the bottom). 
 24. This Article also avoids questions concerning whether regulatory com-
petition would hamper effective enforcement by geographically separating po-
licyholders from their regulators. See, e.g., THERESE M. VAUGHAN, CHIEF EX-
ECUTIVE OFFICER, NAT’L ASS’N. OF INS. COMM’RS, PERSPECTIVES ON SYSTEMIC 
RISK 9–12 (Mar. 5, 2009); Tennyson, supra note 9, at 12–13, 21 (focusing on 
the impact that regulatory competition via an OFC might have on various en-
forcement issues, such as the effectiveness of consumer complaint handling 
and market conduct exams). 
 25. See Grace & Klein, supra note 5, at 111 (“Insurers under a federal 
charter would need to prepare reports for and respond to inquiries from only 
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may be a desirable outcome, various regulatory reforms—
including modified versions of the OFC and SLS—could accom-
plish this goal without promoting regulatory competition.26 To 
be sure, each of these alternatives would themselves be imper-
fect.27 But the goal of this Article is not to definitively establish 
the pros and cons of all reform proposals. Rather, it is to dem-
onstrate, in the insurance context, that a reform proposal’s em-
brace of regulatory competition ought to count as a substantial 
negative in evaluating it. For similar reasons, the Article does 
not address the impact of enhanced regulatory competition on 
American insurance regulators’ coordination with international 
regulatory authorities.28  
Despite these omissions, the Article’s conclusion that regu-
latory competition would degrade the content of insurance reg-
ulation has important policy implications. First, it largely un-
dermines the case for the SLS proposal, which is premised on 
the notion that regulatory competition would promote optimal 
insurance regulation.29 Second, this Article raises substantial—
though not definitive—concerns about OFC proposals. It also 
specifically rejects the claims of some that the OFC’s limited 
 
one regulator, rather than multiple regulators.”); Klein, Overview, supra note 
5, at 40–42. 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 39–41 (discussing various proposals 
that would reduce duplicative compliance costs without promoting regulatory 
competition); see also text accompanying notes 356–357 (noting that regulato-
ry competition is not necessary to reduce compliance costs). 
 27. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing 
the importance of comparative institutional analysis, given the fact that all 
institutions are imperfect but nonetheless enjoy comparative benefits over 
other institutions). 
 28. See generally Brown, supra note 3, at 972, 987–88 (discussing such 
impacts). In any event, it is likely that enhanced regulatory competition would 
exacerbate the difficulty of American insurance regulators’ coordination with 
international authorities by eliminating the capacity of any one body or consti-
tuency to represent American insurance regulators’ interests on the world 
stage. 
 29. Butler and Ribstein contend that “[t]he major problem with the cur-
rent system of insurance regulation that needs to be fixed is that it turns what 
could be the big advantage for the United States in the global marketplace—
the ‘genius’ of our federal system—into a significant disadvantage, where do-
mestic firms are crippled by multiple state regulation and foreign firms are 
deterred from entering.” Butler & Ribstein, Regulating Insurance, supra note 
12, at 9; see also Ruquet, supra note 9, at 10 (arguing that insurers should 
have the right to choose who regulates them). 
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form of regulatory competition would promote improved insur-
ance regulation.30 
This Article develops a three-part framework for analyzing 
the impact of regulatory competition on the content of regula-
tion. First, it examines the demand side of regulatory markets, 
focusing on how insurers—the “buyers” in regulatory mar-
kets—would select among competing regulators—the “sellers” 
in these markets. Second, it assesses the supply side of regula-
tory markets, or how competing regulators would respond to 
insurers’ demand for regulation. Finally, it looks at the extent 
to which regulatory competition schemes can employ minimum 
standards, judicial oversight, risk-based insurance require-
ments, and other design elements that regulate the regulatory 
market, producing controlled competition among different regu-
lators. Part I further explains this three-part analytical frame-
work and provides an overview of the current OFC and SLS 
proposals that promote regulatory competition. 
Part II examines the first element of this tripartite frame-
work—the demand side of regulatory markets—and analyzes 
how individual insurers would choose among multiple regula-
tors were they empowered to do so. It concludes that insurers 
offering consumer-oriented coverage would inevitably “demand” 
deregulation, irrespective of the social desirability of this out-
come. Market forces would exert only minimal discipline on in-
surers’ regulatory choices, and the legitimate interests of third 
parties would be entirely excluded from insurers’ calculus. In 
fact, insurers’ regulatory demand might actually harm the col-
lective interests of insurers themselves; regulatory choice could 
destabilize the capacity of regulation to solve prisoner’s dilem-
ma problems by allowing individual insurers to “cheat” from 
the collective optimum. And the prospect that a competing reg-
 
 30. Scott Harrington has argued that “optional federal chartering could 
promote beneficial regulatory competition,” because it could “discipline the po-
tential excesses of either state or federal regulators.” Harrington, supra note 
9, at 22. Martin Grace and Hal Scott have also claimed that the OFC might be 
beneficial because “efficiency in the provision of public goods can also be en-
hanced competition among government agencies for their provision, since gov-
ernment regulators can be monopolists and suffer from principal-asset prob-
lems of their own.” Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 57; see also GRACE & 
KLEIN, infra note 139, at 3 (“Some have expressed concerns that an OFC 
would lead to competition between federal and state regulators that would ul-
timately degrade rather than improve insurance regulation. However, we ar-
gue that if good regulation benefits consumers and they value these benefits, 
then insurers will be motivated to seek optimal regulatory jurisdictions that 
would increase rather than diminish firm value.”).  
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ulator might offer particularly attractive direct services to in-
surers—such as policy design, data aggregation, or fraud detec-
tion—would be unlikely to alter this result given the en-
trenched role of industry associations in supplying such 
services to insurers. 
Part III analyzes regulatory supply, including the extent to 
which regulatory demand would improve the political economy 
of state insurance regulation. It argues that the deregulatory 
forces that regulatory competition would produce are not nor-
matively desirable. Insurance regulation is structurally more 
susceptible to underregulation than overregulation, particular-
ly outside of the solvency domain. Although solvency regulation 
can be criticized on efficiency grounds, Part III argues that 
regulatory competition is not the answer. Rather, regulatory 
competition would actually undermine solvency modernization 
because it is largely incompatible with effective principles-based 
regulation. Finally, it contends that regulatory competition 
would not improve regulatory specialization relative to the sta-
tus quo.  
Part IV applies the third part of the analytical framework, 
evaluating the extent to which effective institutional design 
could harness the benefits of regulatory competition while lim-
iting its costs. It argues that such regulation of regulatory 
markets would likely be only partially effective. With respect to 
market conduct regulation and other forms of nonsolvency reg-
ulation, it suggests that minimum standards intended to limit 
the risk of excessive deregulation would be difficult to enforce. 
Similarly, allowing individual states to opt-out of a regulatory 
competition scheme in order to preserve consumer protections 
would provide only a limited check on these risks. Designing 
regulatory competition to promote effective solvency regulation 
is also a challenge, as neither guarantee funds nor market-
oriented approaches are likely to prove effective in an OFC or 
SLS scheme.  
This Article concludes by acknowledging the potential need 
to reform insurance regulation. But rather than embracing 
regulatory competition, this Article concludes that effective 
reform should strive to avoid it. Numerous potential reforms do 
just that, such as proposals to create a single federal insurance 
regulator, empower a federal agency to coordinate state regula-
tion, or create a federal regulator for all multistate insurers. To 
be sure, each of these options has its own distinctive flaws. It is 
for this reason that the Article leaves open the possibility that 
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proposals which mildly increase regulatory competition—such 
as an OFC option with mandatory consumer safeguards—may 
ultimately be the least-worst reform options. But before so con-
cluding, policymakers should more carefully scrutinize propos-
als that avoid enhancing regulatory competition, rather than 
reflexively importing the regulatory architecture of banking 
and corporate law into the insurance sphere. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY COMPETITION   
In its broadest sense, regulatory competition has two basic 
ingredients. First, business entities or individuals must have 
some degree of choice among at least two regulatory systems. 
In some cases, exercising that choice may be quite costly, re-
quiring, for instance, physically locating oneself in a jurisdic-
tion with the desired regulatory scheme or selling products ex-
clusively within that jurisdiction. In other cases, the targets of 
regulation may be able to exercise regulatory choice much more 
easily, simply by filing documents with a particular jurisdiction 
or writing contracts that reference that jurisdiction.31 The 
second necessary component of regulatory competition is that 
individual jurisdictions must have some incentive to attract re-
gulated parties to their regime.32 These incentives can include 
increasing tax revenues, promoting economic growth, or simply 
expanding regulatory influence.33  
Section A of this Part provides a brief overview of the regu-
latory reform debate in insurance and its linkage to regulatory 
competition. It focuses on the two proposals that would en-
hance regulatory competition in insurance by empowering in-
surers to select among competing regulators without changing 
their base of operations or the location of their insurance sales. 
Section B then examines three key issues that frame the debate 
in the extant literature about the ways in which regulatory 
 
 31. See Harrington, supra note 9, at 28–29. 
 32. See Esty & Geradin, supra note 17, at xxiii. 
 33. This conception of regulatory competition mirrors that given in Esty & 
Geradin, supra note 17, at xxiii–xxiv. Note that this definition of regulatory 
competition does not consider preemption threats from the federal govern-
ment. Such threats may substantially impact regulatory evolution. See Mark 
J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 601–07 (2003) (noting 
that federal law often limits, or threatens to limit, states’ authority to regulate 
internal affairs). However, they can be distinguished from regulatory competi-
tion because the federal government can unilaterally preempt state law in the 
insurance realm. But see Tennyson, supra note 9, at 21 (characterizing the 
threat of federal preemption in insurance as regulatory competition). 
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competition impacts the substance of regulation. These three 
issues organize the remainder of the Article.  
A. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND INSURANCE REFORM 
The current scheme of American insurance regulation en-
trusts individual states and territories to regulate insurance 
transactions that occur within their boundaries.34 As with vir-
tually any regulatory scheme, it creates some degree of regula-
tory competition.35 In most cases, insurers that disfavor a par-
ticular jurisdiction’s regulatory regime can shift their sales 
elsewhere to avoid this regulation.36 But this mechanism for 
exercising regulatory choice is costly, as profits can generally 
be made by selling coverage even in jurisdictions with regulato-
ry regimes that insurers perceive to be excessive.37 For this 
reason, insurers almost never exercise this form of regulatory 
choice, and their occasional threats to do so are rarely credi-
ble.38  
 
 34. See Randall, supra note 1, at 629. See generally Macey & Miller, supra 
note 1, at 20–26.  
 35. Indeed, regulatory competition is an important topic in fields ranging 
from tax, labor, and financial services law to environmental regulation. See 
generally Esty & Geradin, supra note 17, at ixx–xxxi (discussing the evolution 
of regulatory competition theory in different substantive literatures). 
 36. Interestingly, regulators often attempt to prevent insurers from exit-
ing a state. This practice is both controversial and only partially effective. See 
generally Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Fe-
deralism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 300–08 (1999) (describing in-
surers’ exit rights and how states limit these rights). 
 37. One exception to this point involves captive insurance companies, 
which effectively only sell insurance to one company and generally need only 
become licensed in one state to reach a market of purchasers in other states. 
See infra notes 288–89 and accompanying text. 
 38. See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: 
THE CASE OF INSURANCE 53 (1998). See generally Bruce G. Carruthers & 
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competi-
tion on Regulatory Standards (UCLA Ctr. for Econ. History Working Paper, 
2009), available at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Lamoreaux/Lamoreaux 
484.pdf (arguing that firms across regulatory contexts rarely exit for regulato-
ry reasons when doing so requires physically relocating or substantially alter-
ing their sales practices). The biggest exception to this point is that many 
property insurers have recently left Florida, thus their threats to leave were 
certainly credible. See Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, The Perfect Storm: 
Hurricanes, Insurance, and Regulation, 12 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 81, 85–86 
(2009); see also infra note 228 and accompanying text. Florida is distinctive, 
though, as there are obviously nonregulatory factors, like hurricanes, which 
make it more risky to provide insurance in the state. See Grace & Klein, su-
pra, at 81–82. There has also been some evidence of increased movement of 
insurers to states that have relaxed certain elements of their insurance regu-
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Although regulating insurers where they sell coverage pro-
duces minimal regulatory competition, it generates a host of 
problems. Foremost among these is that state regulation 
creates some degree of duplicative compliance costs and incon-
sistencies for insurers that sell coverage in more than one 
state.39 Indeed, multistate insurers must design different prod-
ucts to conform with different states’ regulatory standards, ac-
quire licenses from multiple states, and employ differing un-
derwriting models in different states.40 Although these 
duplicative costs have decreased substantially in the last dec-
ade due to state coordination via the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), many assert that there is a 
natural limit to the effectiveness of these efforts.41 
 
lation. See DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COM-
PETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 131, 256–58 (J. David Cum-
mins ed., 2002) (analyzing automobile insurance rates in Illinois, the only 
state operating without rate regulatory law). 
 39. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 58. 
 40. See SHEILA BLAIR, UNIV. OF MASS. ISENBERG SCH. OF MGMT., CON-
SUMER RAMIFICATIONS OF AN OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER FOR LIFE INSUR-
ERS 32–37 (2004) (attempting to quantify the costs of duplicative regulation in 
the life insurance industry); Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 40–41. Insurers 
often complain that market conduct exams by different states are duplicative. 
See Robert W. Klein & James W. Schacht, An Assessment of Insurance Market 
Conduct Surveillances, 20 J. INS. REG. 51, 79 (2001). Others, however, suggest 
that insurance market conduct exams are extraordinarily uncommon in most 
states. See JEFFREY STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE (2008). 
 41. Among other activities, the NAIC drafts model laws, collects and ag-
gregates state-level data, helps administer solvency regulation by an insurer’s 
state of domicile, and helps coordinate market conduct regulation to reduce 
duplicative compliance costs. See Randall, supra note 1, at 636–38, 640–41. 
The NAIC has also facilitated the development of an interstate compact to 
provide coordinated review and approval of life insurers’ product filings. See 
Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission, History, http://www 
.insurancecompact.org/history.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). Nonetheless, 
many view these approaches as skirting the fundamental problem that insur-
ance is an interstate, and increasingly an international, business. See Klein, 
Overview, supra note 5, at 42 (arguing that states have “embark[ed] on ambi-
tious policy and institutional reforms” designed to “streamline, harmonize, 
and rationalize the current system of state regulation,” but noting that “there 
is a limit to how far harmonization can go”); Martin Grace, A Reexamination of 
Federal Regulation in the Insurance Industry 21 (Networks Fin. Inst., Policy 
Brief No. 2009-PB-02, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1350538. For more on this issue, see infra notes 313–16 and 
accompanying text (describing coordination efforts by the NAIC and contrast-
ing this with the lack of coordination that would result from a single state opt-
ing to impose its own set of insurance laws and regulations).  
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Numerous proposals have been advanced in the last sever-
al decades to address these claimed costs of the state-based in-
surance scheme. For instance, the State Modernization and 
Regulatory Transparency Act (SMART Act) would have created 
a federal agency to help coordinate state insurance regulation 
and expanded the influence of the NAIC.42 A recent working 
paper by state insurance regulators proposes a similar role for 
the federal government in facilitating uniformity among state 
regulators without preempting state regulation.43 The Insur-
ance Company Protection Act of 2003 would have required all 
multistate insurers to be chartered at the federal level, but left 
single-state insurers to be chartered at the state level.44 And, of 
course, some proposals would scrap the state-based system of 
insurance regulation entirely and replace it with a single feder-
al regulatory scheme.45  
Other proposed reforms attempt to address the duplicative 
and overlapping nature of state insurance regulation by allow-
ing insurers to choose a single regulator irrespective of the lo-
cation of their insurance sales.46 By permitting insurers to 
choose a single regulator, this strategy obviously limits the ex-
tent to which multistate insurers will be subject to duplicative 
and overlapping regulatory schemes.47 At the same time, 
though, these types of reform fundamentally alter the degree of 
regulatory competition in insurance regulation. Unlike the sta-
tus quo, they allow insurers to exercise regulatory choice with-
out incurring any meaningful cost as a result. As evidenced by 
similar forms of regulatory competition in the financial services 
 
 42. See Brown, supra note 23, at 32–34; Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 
44–45.  
 43. See NAT’L INS. SUPERVISORY COMM’N, REGULATORY MODERNIZATION: 
DISCUSSION DRAFT FOR STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE 1 (2009), available at http:// 
www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_rmsg_nisc_discussion_draft.pdf (describ-
ing the basic elements of the proposal). 
 44. See Brown, supra note 23, at 37–38. A similar proposal, advanced by 
Robert Cooper, envisions that “the federal government would be the rule-
maker, and the state insurance commissioners would enforce those rules with-
in their states.” Robert W. Cooper, OFC: Is it Really Overkill?, 26 J. INS. REG. 
5, 9 (2008). Unfortunately, this proposal is clearly unconstitutional under Su-
preme Court case law preventing the federal government from commandeer-
ing state governments. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).  
 45. See, e.g., Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 49; Brown, supra note 23, 
at 63–75 (outlining various federal regulatory schemes).  
 46. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 39–42. 
 47. See id. at 38–39. 
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and corporate law spheres, this dramatically increases the de-
gree of competition among regulators.48  
Two reforms of this variety have received particular atten-
tion in recent months. The first, dubbed the Single-License So-
lution (SLS), would mimic the structure of jurisdictional com-
petition in corporate law.49 Corporations have long been 
permitted to incorporate, or reincorporate, in any state, and in-
dividual states receive various potential benefits from attract-
ing incorporations, including increased tax revenue.50 The SLS 
would similarly permit insurers to select a single state insur-
ance regulator to govern all of their insurance operations and 
allow states to tax the sales of the insurers they regulate.51 In 
addition to allowing insurers to select their regulator of choice, 
the SLS proposal would permit insurers to choose the law go-
verning disputes with policyholders.52  
The proponents of the SLS recognize the possibility that it 
could produce a race to the bottom, and they propose several 
safeguards to limit that risk.53 First, the SLS would permit 
state legislatures to opt-out and impose their own consumer 
protection regulations and laws, so long as the legislative opt-
out only applied prospectively and insurers maintained a clear 
right to exit the state.54 Second, the proposal would potentially 
require all insurers to issue “solvency bonds.”55 Investors who 
purchased an insurer’s solvency bond would receive a market-
determined yield on their investment if the guarantee fund of 
 
 48. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 28; Carruthers & Lamo-
reaux, supra note 38, at 2 (noting that firms regularly exercise choice among 
competing regulatory schemes when doing so simply requires changing their 
corporate identity or source of capital).  
 49. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 39; see also Butler & Ribstein, Re-
gulating Insurance, supra note 12, at 14–15 (calling the SLS an “analogous 
proposal for insurance regulation”); Harrington, supra note 9, at 28.  
 50. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPO-
RATE LAW 6–48 (1993). Delaware generally dominates this regulatory competi-
tion, with most corporations choosing to incorporate either in the state of their 
principal place of business or in Delaware. See id. at 6; Roe, supra note 33, at 
594–96.  
 51. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 39–40. 
 52. See id. at 40 (explaining that such a choice would ultimately lower 
prices by ensuring certainty). 
 53. These safeguards are individually addressed infra Part IV. 
 54. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40. This requirement is impor-
tant given the historical tendency of states to refuse to allow insurers to with-
draw. See Epstein, supra note 36, at 300. For more on this issue, see infra Part 
IV.A.2. 
 55. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40. 
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the insurer’s chosen regulator did not default in the contrac-
tually specified time period.56 By contrast, if the guarantee 
fund of the insurer’s chosen regulator did default, then the pur-
chasers of the bond would lose their investment, which would 
presumably be used to make up for the state guarantee fund’s 
default.57 The central idea behind requiring the purchase of 
these bonds is that their yield will reflect the strength of a 
state’s solvency regulation—and thus the likelihood that its 
guarantee fund will fail—thereby causing firms to avoid states 
with excessively lax solvency regulation.58  
A second prominent reform proposal, known as the Option-
al Federal Charter (OFC), would introduce a more limited form 
of regulatory competition into insurance regulation.59 The OFC 
proposal is modeled on the dual banking system, which allows 
banks to acquire a charter at either the state or federal level.60 
Banks that opt for a state charter must select the state in 
which they have their principal place of business.61 The OFC 
would similarly give insurers the option of opting out of the 
current system of state insurance regulation, in favor of a sin-
gle federal regulator.62 As in the banking system, insurers 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. For further explanation of how these bonds would work and 
discussion of potential problems, see infra Part IV.B.2. 
 58. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40. 
 59. See Harrington, supra note 9, at 22. 
 60. See Detlefsen, supra note 11, at 98. 
 61. See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 95 
(3d ed. 2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1987). Banks that charter at the federal level have some de-
gree of choice among multiple regulatory bodies, including the Office of 
Comptroller of Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Re-
serve. Although current reform proposals could alter the extent of regulatory 
competition among federal banking regulators, they all leave intact the dual 
system of banking regulation. See Helene Cooper, Obama Pushes Financial 
Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at A20; Damian Paletta, Historic Over-
haul of Finance Rules, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2009, at A1; Brian Wingfield, 
Bank Regulation Blowout, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2009, available at http://www 
.newsweek.com/id/202379.  
 62. See Detlefsen, supra note 11, at 98. See generally Grace & Scott, supra 
note 7, at 55–91 (explaining how an OFC would function). Under most propos-
als, the federal insurance regulator would be housed within the Department of 
the Treasury. See Broome, supra note 23, at 206. Recent OFC proposals were 
introduced in the House in April of 2009 by Representatives Melissa Bean and 
Ed Royce, and in the Senate in May of 2007 by Senators John Sununu and 
Tim Johnson. See Grace, supra note 41, at 4–7. Grace criticizes these recent 
OFC proposals for “merely copy[ing] the structure of the banking system.” Id. 
at 8. 
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would be free to switch back and forth between the state and 
federal regulator.63 Various versions of OFC proposals exist, 
but most do not explicitly permit insurers to include in their 
policies choice-of-law provisions specifying the state law gov-
erning the resolution of insurer-policyholder disputes.64  
The degree of regulatory competition that the OFC would 
actually generate is sometimes contested. The OFC would 
clearly create less regulatory competition than the SLS, as it 
envisions two competing regulatory systems rather than fifty. 
But several commentators have suggested that even this choice 
would be illusory, leading to a “one-way street” where large na-
tional insurers would inevitably choose to charter federally in 
order to avoid the duplicative nature of the state regulatory re-
gime.65  
While it is possible that a national insurance regulator 
might, in fact, have a comparative advantage over state regula-
tors in attracting large insurers, the OFC would nonetheless 
create some nontrivial degree of regulatory competition. First, 
small and medium-sized insurers that only operated in a few 
states would not necessarily favor a federal regulator over a 
state regulator, especially given the potential costs associated 
with switching. Second, the costs to insurers of complying with 
multiple state regulators have decreased substantially in re-
cent years.66 As a result, the potential benefits that insurers 
would enjoy from dealing with a single regulator are more like-
ly to be outweighed by the prospect of less stringent regulation 
imposed by multiple state regulators. Finally, both state and 
federal regulators would have strong incentives to attract in-
surers to their system under most OFC proposals. For states, 
those incentives would include their receipt of regulatory fees 
and avoiding the de facto nationalization of insurance regula-
tion.67 The incentives of a federal insurance regulator to attract 
 
 63. See Detlefsen, supra note 11, at 98.  
 64. For example, a 2009 bill proposing an OFC does not give insurers un-
fettered choice. See National Insurance Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1880, 
111th Cong. § 312 (2009) (allowing the insurer to choose its principle place of 
business, main office, or location of its policyholder as its jurisdiction). 
 65. See Broome, supra note 23, at 220; Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 
38 (stating that OFC would merely provide “the mirage of competition”).  
 66. See infra text accompanying note 315. 
 67. Although most OFC proposals permit states to continue to tax insur-
ers that opt for a federal charter, “the removal of a significant portion of the 
industry from state oversight could substantially reduce other state-imposed 
regulatory fees, which have served as a major source of funding for state in-
surance departments.” Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 46. 
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insurers are dependent on the details of different OFC propos-
als.68 But most OFC proposals envision that fees imposed on 
regulated entities would fund the federal insurance regulator, 
and an insurer’s choice to charter federally could also impact 
the scope of the federal regulators’ power and authority.69 
There is substantial evidence that similar fee structures for the 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) give them a strong incentive to attract and 
retain regulated banks.70  
B. THE DESIRABILITY OF REGULATORY COMPETITION  
Although the desirability of regulatory competition has re-
ceived only minimal sustained scholarly attention in insur-
ance,71 it has been analyzed exhaustively in corporate law, se-
curities law, and banking law. This section distills a 
substantial portion of this literature by describing three major 
issues that determine the impact of enhanced regulatory com-
petition on the substance of regulation. It first isolates argu-
ments concerning regulatory demand, or the process by which 
regulated entities select their regulators within a scheme of 
regulatory competition. Second, it describes arguments regard-
ing regulatory supply, or the likely responses of regulators to 
regulatory demand. Third, it reviews several potential mechan-
isms for “regulating” the process of regulatory competition in 
order to prevent a race to the bottom. The remainder of this Ar-
ticle applies this framework to the regulation of insurance, ana-
lyzing regulatory demand in Part II, regulatory supply in Part 
III, and the regulation of regulatory markets in Part IV. 
1. Regulatory Demand  
Not surprisingly, the effects of regulatory competition on 
substantive law are inextricably linked to the way that regu-
lated entities choose among competing regulators. Thus, one of 
the most common defenses of regulatory choice is that the in-
terests of regulated entities in selecting among competing regu-
 
 68. See infra Part IV.  
 69. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 78–79. The scope of the federal 
regulators’ authority might be particularly important to a new federal insur-
ance regulator interested in establishing its authority and stature. 
 70. See, e.g., Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Charter Switching and the 
Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Office of Thrift Supervision 6–8 (Ill. Corp. 
Law Colloquium Working Paper 2009).  
 71. See supra notes 12–13.  
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lators match the interests of the intended beneficiaries of regu-
lation. This argument is particularly important in corporate 
law, which regulates the internal affairs of corporations and is 
principally intended to benefit shareholders. Proponents of 
state chartering argue that managers will incorporate in the 
state that best promotes the interests of shareholders.72 Al-
though shareholders cannot easily observe managers’ everyday 
decisions, they can monitor and react to managers’ selection of 
a regulatory regime.73 The efficiency of capital markets conse-
quently means that the price of the corporation’s shares will ac-
curately reflect this choice.74 Because managers seek to maxim-
ize the price of corporate stock—doing so results in higher pay, 
greater job security, more valuable stock options, and enhanced 
reputation—they will select an optimal regulatory regime for 
shareholders.75 This, in turn, motivates jurisdictions to compete 
in generating efficient corporate law.76  
By contrast, detractors of regulatory competition in corpo-
rate law generally dispute the claim that the sole driving force 
behind managerial decisionmaking is increasing stock prices.77 
Although increases in stock price will generally improve man-
agers’ job security and compensation, occasionally choices that 
decrease share price may best serve managers’ personal inter-
ests. In particular, corporate laws that directly enhance man-
 
 72. Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 276 (1977); see also FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 6–7 (1991); ROMANO, supra note 50, at 15; Robert M. Daines, Does 
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525 (2001) (arguing 
that empirical evidence favors a race to the top, as Delaware firms are worth 
more than similar firms incorporated in other jurisdictions).  
 73. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 72, at 1–3 (describing the 
agency problem of corporate law and how various different mechanisms of cor-
porate law help to address these agency problems).  
 74. See id. at 17–21; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2366–67 (1998); Win-
ter, supra note 72, at 275–76. 
 75. See Winter, supra note 72, at 266. 
 76. See Romano, supra note 74, at 2366–67; Winter, supra note 72, at 
275–76. As in all markets, the pace of evolution towards this efficient market 
outcome may be slow, and punctuated by wrong turns. See EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 72, at 220–22; Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the 
Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 168–70 (2003).  
 77. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The De-
sirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1435, 1445 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflec-
tions upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974); Melvin Avon Eisenberg, 
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1510 (1989). 
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agers’ job security and compensation—such as barriers to hos-
tile takeovers—may more than offset the indirect impact of de-
creased share price on job security and compensation.78 At least 
with respect to these issues, critics of jurisdictional competition 
argue that the status quo system has promoted a “race to the 
bottom” in corporate law.79 
The corporate law scheme of regulatory competition has 
prompted reform proposals in a number of other fields, includ-
ing securities law, where some have argued that issuers ought 
to be allowed to opt-out of the federal regime and choose a sin-
gle state that would govern their securities transactions.80 As 
in corporate law, defenders of regulatory competition argue 
that issuers would select a disclosure regime that best met the 
interests of investors because doing so would maximize the 
price of their securities.81 Similarly, critics of such regulatory 
choice in securities law argue that the interests of issuers are 
not, in fact, aligned with regulatory objectives, which include 
social benefits that go beyond the interests of individual inves-
tors.82  
 
 78. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Takeover 
Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, in REGULATORY COMPETI-
TION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 
17, at 68, 73–74; Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Compe-
tition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1800 (2002); Eisenberg, supra 
note 77, at 1510. 
 79. See Bebchuk, supra note 77, at 1444–45, 1458–68 (arguing that juris-
dictional competition may benefit certain elements of corporate law, even 
while it promotes a race to the bottom elsewhere, where the interests of man-
agers and shareholders are not aligned). 
 80. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Re-
thinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
903, 947–48 (1998); see also Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Depen-
dence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1702 
(2002); Romano, supra note 74, at 2367–68, 2383–88 (arguing that jurisdic-
tional competition should govern the registration of securities and continuous 
disclosure requirements). Others have advocated for extending such regulato-
ry competition to the regulation of securities exchanges as well. See Jonathan 
R. Macey, Regulatory Competition in the US Federal System: Banking and Fi-
nancial Services, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES supra note 17, at 95, 105–09. 
 81. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 80, 1704–05; Rafael La Porta et al., What 
Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 23–25 (2006) (concluding that issuers 
tend to raise capital in countries where there are strong disclosure regimes, 
suggesting that it is in the interest of issuers to find strong regulation); Macey, 
supra note 80, at 106; Romano, supra note 74, at 2414. 
 82. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why 
Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1342–69 
(1999). 
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Unlike in corporate and securities law, the banking law lit-
erature does not generally defend regulatory competition based 
primarily on claims that banks would demand efficient regula-
tion.83 In part, this is because a core goal of banking law is to 
promote the safety and soundness of banks.84 As such, its prin-
cipal purpose is to limit the externalities associated with failed 
banks, including systemic risk.85 There is little reason to expect 
that banks would fully consider this risk in selecting a regula-
tor, as these costs (by definition) fall on unrelated third par-
ties.86 
Perhaps even more importantly, banking law is partially 
designed to protect ordinary consumers. By contrast, regulatory 
competition in corporate law applies only to the internal affairs 
of corporations and does not extend to the regulation of corpo-
rate behavior in the consumer markets where they sell their 
products.87 Many banking law scholars have argued that banks 
offering consumer services—particularly credit cards—
generally exploit regulatory competition to select regimes that 
harm their customers. Regulatory competition in this domain 
expands beyond the dual federal/state choice normally asso-
ciated with banking regulation, as the state in which a national 
bank is located has historically determined many of the con-
sumer protection laws applicable to that bank’s operations.88 As 
 
 83. But cf. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, 
the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 
58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1250 (1990) (“As in the case of corporate charter-
ing, investor discipline could play a substantial role in restraining state com-
petition in bank chartering, provided that state banks are required to main-
tain substantial amounts of equity capital.”). 
 84. Kathleen J. Woody, The International Economic Implications of Dere-
gulating the U.S. Banking Industry, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 25, 77 (1981). 
 85. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 251. 
 86. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 33. Consistent with this 
reasoning, recent evidence suggests that bank charter switching may have 
promoted deregulation, which helped cause the recent financial crisis. See Do-
nelson & Zaring, supra note 70, at 18–19. The role of externalities is also im-
portant in the securities and corporate law contexts. Much of the debate about 
regulatory competition in securities law turns on the potential third-party ef-
fects of securities regulation. Compare Fox, supra note 82, at 1342–63, with 
Romano, supra note 74, at 2380–81. In corporate law, proponents of jurisdic-
tional competition generally dismiss the claim that corporate law should pro-
mote the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, 
Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2006).  
 87. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 72.  
 88. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. 
Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 310 (1978) (holding that usury laws applicable to a na-
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a result, national banks have been free to “export” the consum-
er protection laws of the state in which they are located to con-
sumers across the country.89 It is abundantly clear that this 
exportation doctrine has resulted in national banks choosing to 
locate in states that pursue deregulation (particularly South 
Dakota).90 And most commentators argue that, in doing so, na-
tional banks purposely exploit their least-informed consum-
ers.91 Others, however, suggest that banks have selected dereg-
ulatory regimes precisely because doing so advances the 
rational self-interest of their customers.92 
2. Regulatory Supply  
Firms operating in a scheme of regulatory competition may 
select regulators that minimize costs and regulatory con-
straints, irrespective of whether they protect the interests of 
the intended beneficiaries of regulation. But the mere fact that 
regulated entities would demand an inefficiently minimalist 
regulatory regime does not necessarily mean that competing 
regulators would supply such a regime. Competing regulators 
are usually responsive to considerations other than attracting 
regulated entities. These considerations are numerous, and in-
clude faithfully pursuing regulatory objectives, currying favor 
from political groups, avoiding negative media scrutiny, gener-
ating fundraising sources, and expanding regulatory power and 
 
tional bank’s operations are determined by the state in which that bank is lo-
cated). Subsequent cases expanded this doctrine to encompass various other 
consumer protection laws in the credit context. See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The 
Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Pre-
datory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 520–22 (2004). Recent fed-
eral reforms of the laws governing credit cards substantially reduce the capac-
ity of a jurisdiction to export lax laws to other states. See generally Credit 
Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, 123 
Stat. 1734 (2009). 
 89. See Schiltz, supra note 88, at 520–22. 
 90. Id. at 552 (noting South Dakota and Delaware in particular). 
 91. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 86–95 (2008); Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive 
Practice Enforcement in Financial Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279, 
297 (2009); Adam J. Levitan, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Mar-
kets Upstream, YALE J. ON REG. 143, 159 (2009); Art E. Wilmarth Jr., The 
Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of 
the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1002–25 (2009). 
 92. See generally Todd J. Zwycki, Economics of Credit Cards (George Ma-
son Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 00-22, 2000), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=229356 (arguing that Marquette’s 
holding, which acquiesced to the selection of deregulated regimes, inevitably 
led to a “market more responsive to consumer demand”). 
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prestige.93 Many of these considerations will often weigh 
against simply dismantling regulatory restrictions in response 
to regulatory demand.94  
Firms’ demand for laxity in a scheme of regulatory compe-
tition is particularly unlikely to dominate other regulatory in-
puts to the extent that regulatory choice is limited to only a few 
competing regulators, as in the case of the dual banking system 
or OFC proposals.95 As the number of competing regulators de-
creases, the importance of regulatory demand, as compared to 
more traditional inputs into regulators’ decision-making calcu-
lus, decreases as well. This is no different than ordinary mar-
kets, where decreased competition is often thought to decrease 
firms’ incentives to respond to consumer preferences.96  
To the extent that regulatory demand simply supplements, 
but does not overwhelm, other factors that impact regulators’ 
decisions, it may ultimately improve the political economy of 
regulation. This is because competing regulators may improve 
efficiency without sacrificing effectiveness in their efforts to 
balance wooing regulated entities with their competing regula-
tory interests. For instance, they may eliminate ineffective reg-
ulatory hurdles, develop innovative but effective new rules, or 
develop specialized expertise.97  
Scholars often employ these arguments to defend the dual 
banking system. First, proponents of dual banking often claim 
that bank regulators are prone to excessive regulation due to 
 
 93. See, e.g., MEIER, supra note 38, at 167 (describing the complex and 
multifaceted nature of political economy of regulation). 
 94. See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Hold-
ing Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 335 (1987); Wilmarth, supra note 83, at 
1242 (“[T]he ‘competition in laxity’ argument overlooks the strong incentive of 
both elected public officials and appointed bank regulators to avoid bank fail-
ures.”). The risk that excessively lax regulation would prompt federal action to 
dismantle the scheme of regulatory competition might similarly prevent exces-
sive deregulation. See Tamar Frankel, The Dual State-Federal Regulation of 
Financial Institutions—A Policy Proposal, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 60 (1987). 
 95. See supra text accompanying notes 58–94. 
 96. See Bebchuk, supra note 77, at 1438. 
 97. Of course, these arguments are consistent with the notion that banks 
demand inefficiently lax regulations: “specialization” and “innovation” may 
simply refer to excessively lax standards in the relevant area. See Elizabeth F. 
Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a 
Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 52–57 (2005); 
Melanie L. Fein, The Fragmented Depository Institutions System: A Case for 
Unification, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 633, 675–700 (1980) (arguing that a dual bank-
ing system promotes a race in laxity with respect to safety and soundness reg-
ulation).  
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“ordinary” political economy factors such as the fear of negative 
media attention.98 Regulatory demand for lax regulation may 
provide a limited, but socially desirable, counterweight.99 It al-
so provides banks with at least one “escape valve” against the 
most oppressive instances of excessive regulation.100 Second, 
defenders of dual banking argue that it promotes innovation. 
Critics of regulation often claim that regulators have little rea-
son to proactively embrace innovation, because doing so takes 
time and effort.101 Limited regulatory competition may encour-
age regulators to experiment with innovative regulations in or-
der to attract regulated entities.102 Indeed, proponents of dual 
banking have linked limited regulatory competition to such in-
novations as “checking accounts, branch banking, real estate 
lending, [and] trust services.”103 Third, limited regulatory com-
petition may cause regulators to specialize in the regulation of 
particular types of banks. In particular, defenders of the dual 
banking system often note that local banks tend to charter at 
the state level, which may be more sensitive to local issues, 
whereas national banks tend to adopt national charters.104 
 
 98. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 76–77 (quoting the Federal Re-
serve stating that ordinarily, monopolistic bank regulation would “have a long-
term bias against risk-taking and innovation” because regulators “receive[ ] no 
plaudits for contributing to economic growth through facilitating prudent risk-
taking, but [they are] severely criticized for too many bank failures.”); see also 
Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual 
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 716 (1988); Kenneth E. Scott, The 
Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 36 (1977). 
 99. See Scott, supra note 98, at 36 (noting that regulatory competition in 
banking generally results in “broader operating authority” of banks and “fewer 
constraints on profitability,” and noting arguments that this may be desirable 
because it offsets the tendency towards excessive regulation). 
 100. See GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE AND SOUND 
BANKING: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 274 (1986); WILLIAM J. BROWN, THE 
DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 64–65 (1968); MACEY ET AL., 
supra note 61, at 111–22; Scott, supra note 98, at 36. 
 101. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 91, at 84–94. 
 102. See Wilmarth, supra note 83, at 1156. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See, e.g., SUSAN HOFFMANN, POLITICS AND BANKING: IDEAS, PUBLIC 
POLICY, AND THE CREATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 70–83 (2001) (noting 
that theorists have argued that state regulation of local banks is preferable 
because regulators are closer to customers); PETER J. WALLISON, STATE BANK-
ING REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 6–9 (1985); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Dam-
ming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of State Consumer 
Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 907 (2008) (describing this argu-
ment by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) to justify broad 
preemption). 
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Others have extended this argument to defend horizontal regu-
latory competition among competing federal bank regulators.105  
The securities regulation literature offers similar political 
economy arguments in favor of regulatory competition. For in-
stance, proponents of regulatory competition in securities law 
argue that ordinary monopolistic regulation has resulted in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) regulatory inept-
ness, such as its historical refusal to permit firms to disclose 
projected earnings.106 Regulatory competition might improve 
securities regulation by promoting innovations such as the in-
creased use of default rules or a greater role for regulation by 
exchanges.107 It also could allow different regulators to special-
ize in different types of issuers.108 
3. Regulating the Regulatory Market 
The forces of regulatory supply and demand may some-
times produce inefficiently lax regulation. In particular, regu-
lated entities may demand regulation that is excessively lais-
sez-faire, and regulators may be willing to supply such 
regulation in order to capture the “business” of regulated enti-
ties. This process may even trigger a “race to the bottom” as 
regulators compete with each other to offer less and less intru-
sive regulatory schemes.109 In some cases, however, structural 
elements of regulatory markets offset this risk. Such design 
features of regulatory markets effectively “regulate” the market 
for regulatory competition.110 Consider several examples. 
First, and most obviously, a system of regulatory competi-
tion may incorporate safeguards that limit the capacity or wil-
lingness of competing regulators to deregulate beyond a certain 
point. Such safeguards are an important way in which banking 
 
 105. One study, for instance, found that banks that specialize in consumer 
loans tend to shift to the OCC, banks that specialize in commercial loans shift 
to the Federal Reserve, and banks that specialize in real estate construction 
loans tend to switch to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
state charters. Richard J. Rosen, Is Three a Crowd? Competition Among Regu-
lators in Banking, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 967, 990 (2003). 
 106. Romano, supra note 74, at 2378–79. 
 107. See id. at 2395–401. 
 108. See Choi, supra note 80, at 1705. 
 109. Bebchuk, supra note 77, at 1438. 
 110. Cf. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 15 (noting that law markets 
convert ordinary mandatory rules in contract law into default rules, but noting 
that it is possible that “the law market would create a new category [of ] super-
mandatory laws” wherein judges refuse to accept choice of law provisions on 
some issues).  
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regulation attempts to prevent regulatory competition from in-
ducing excessive deregulation of safety and soundness.111 For 
example, the Federal Reserve sets reserve requirements for all 
depository institutions, irrespective of their chosen regulator.112 
This ensures that the forces of regulatory competition do not 
impact reserve requirements—a central element of banks’ safe-
ty and soundness—by removing this issue from the domain of 
regulatory competition.113 Similarly, deposit insurance in bank-
ing may help safeguard against a race to the bottom in safety 
and soundness, as the FDIC offers such insurance to all banks 
and monitors the financial health of its policyholders.114  
Recently, and especially in light of the global financial 
meltdown of 2008, banking commentators have also proposed 
safeguards against a race to the bottom in more conventional 
consumer protection arenas, such as predatory lending and un-
fair/inefficient contract design. The most notable such safe-
guard would create a new federal consumer protection agency 
with broad rule-making authority to protect banking consum-
ers.115 The agency would have authority to set a regulatory 
floor for all banks on a variety of consumer protection issues, 
but would permit competing regulators to go beyond that floor 
in their own domains.116 A different proposal would create suit-
 
 111. Although the text focuses on safeguards in banking, safeguards 
against excessive deregulation in others areas also exist. For instance, some 
understand federal securities laws as a check on state corporate law’s domain 
of competition. See Roe, supra note 33, at 592 (describing how federal securi-
ties law restricts the competition in which states can practically and legally 
engage); Brett McDonnell, The Ambiguous Virtues of Federalism in Corporate 
Law 1 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 03-10, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=424681. 
 112. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980, 12 U.S.C. § 461 (2006). 
 113. See Butler & Macey, supra note 98, at 689. 
 114. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 147 (describing restrictions that 
the FDIC imposes on state banks with deposit insurance). 
 115. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 91, at 98–100 (proposing that financial 
products should be treated as ordinary consumer products, which must be ap-
proved as safe by the Consumer Products Safety Commission); cf. Daniel 
Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance 
Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1397–98 (2007) (proposing that insur-
ance policies should be envisioned as products and that products liability law 
can usefully serve as a model for the role of judicial regulation of those prod-
ucts).  
 116. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 1880, 
111th Cong. (2009).  
  
2010] AGAINST REGULATORY COMPETITION 1733 
 
ability standards for the sale of mortgages.117 Because the pro-
posal would create a private cause of action for violations, it 
would empower the judiciary to check the risk of lax enforce-
ment due to regulatory competition.118  
These safeguards operate on regulatory supply, as they at-
tempt to influence how competing regulators respond to indus-
try demands. But regulatory competition schemes can also be 
designed to improve regulatory demand for effective regula-
tion.119 This is particularly true with respect to solvency regu-
lation, where potential regulatory failures are relatively easy to 
spot ex post. The best example of this approach to structuring a 
system of regulatory competition is the risk-based deposit in-
surance that the FDIC attempts to charge to regulated 
banks.120 Such deposit insurance, if priced accurately to reflect 
expected payouts, should increase banks’ willingness to choose 
an effective safety and soundness regulator.121 That is because 
such a scheme forces banks to internalize ex ante the expected 
social costs of their insolvency risk.  
II.  REGULATORY DEMAND AND INSURANCE   
Regulatory competition transforms regulated business ent-
ities into “customers” by empowering them to shop in a market 
comprised of different regulators.122 As with any market, these 
customers’ preferences are central to predicting the market’s 
outputs.123 If regulators’ customers prefer regulators that effi-
ciently promote regulatory objectives, then a race—or at least a 
 
 117. See Kathleen C. Engel & Pat A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The 
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1318–67 
(2002); Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Applying 
Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Markets, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 814–31 (2009). 
 118. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 117, at 1337, 1357.  
 119. Yet another approach is to limit the consequences of insufficient regu-
lation by enhancing market discipline. Whether this counts as “regulating the 
regulatory” market is questionable, though, as this approach essentially at-
tempts to limit the need for regulation rather than to ensure that regulatory 
competition produces desirable regulation. 
 120. See Butler & Macey, supra note 98, at 699. 
 121. See id. at 712–16. Of course, setting accurate risk-based premiums is 
exceedingly difficult for the government due to political factors. See MACEY ET 
AL., supra note 61, at 279–88 . 
 122. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 14 (“The law market fun-
damentally alters the political process to the extent that it makes people ‘con-
sumers’ or ‘buyers’ of laws rather than simply voters.”). 
 123. See Fox, supra note 82, at 1342 (“The obvious starting point for an in-
quiry into the social welfare effects of adopting issuer choice is to ask what 
kind of disclosure regime each U.S. issuer would select if given the choice.”).  
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crawl—to the top is virtually inevitable. By contrast, if these 
customers view regulation as an unnecessary obstacle and cost, 
then regulatory choice will promote deregulation irrespective of 
its desirability.124  
Although the nature of firms’ regulatory demand is impor-
tant for evaluating any system of regulatory competition, it is 
particularly crucial with respect to schemes, such as the SLS, 
that envision numerous competing regulators. As the number 
of competing jurisdictions increases, the likelihood that at least 
one of those jurisdictions will implement a regulatory scheme 
that meets customers’ demands increases as well.125 So too does 
the competitive pressure on regulators to satisfy regulatory 
demand. A large number of competing regulators can conse-
quently produce a powerful “race to the top” when firm demand 
for regulation is aligned with regulatory objectives. For similar 
reasons, though, a substantial number of competing regulators 
also increases the risk of a race to the bottom when firms de-
mand minimal regulation irrespective of regulatory goals. 
This Part takes up the issue of insurer “demand,” evaluat-
ing the extent to which insurers who were empowered to choose 
among competing regulators would do so in a way that bene-
fited the intended beneficiaries of insurance regulation. Section 
A focuses on consumer-policyholders, the primary intended be-
neficiaries of insurance regulation. It contends that life insur-
ers and property/casualty insurers that provide personal lines 
of coverage could be expected to “demand” lax consumer protec-
tions in a scheme of regulatory competition. This is so irrespec-
tive of whether such demand would actually benefit policyhold-
ers. Section B then considers two other potential beneficiaries 
of insurance regulation: insurers and third parties. It argues 
that insurer demand for competing regulators would ignore 
third party interests, such as limiting social insurance pay-
ments and compensating tort victims. It also suggests that in-
surer demand would do little to directly advance the interests 
of insurers themselves, at least aside from reducing regulatory 
restrictions. Importantly, for purposes of analytical clarity, the 
analysis in this Part proceeds on the assumption that regula-
tion of regulatory markets—such as guarantee funds and mar-
 
 124. If regulators’ customers endorse some forms of efficient regulations 
but not others, then regulatory choice is likely to promote a regime that mim-
ics these preferences. See Bebchuk, supra note 77, at 1458–68.  
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 94–97. 
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ket-based bonding mechanisms—are not present. These issues 
are addressed separately in Part IV. 
A. REGULATORY DEMAND AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN 
INSURANCE MARKETS 
Consumer protection is the central objective of insurance 
regulation.126 Indeed, most of the core functions of insurance 
regulators are directed primarily toward this goal, and regula-
tion of commercial lines of coverage (where policyholders tend 
to be much more sophisticated) is limited.127 For instance, form 
and price regulations attempt to ensure that policyholders re-
ceive reasonable policy terms at fair prices that are not unduly 
discriminatory.128 Claims handling regulations are intended to 
protect insureds by limiting insurers’ ability to deny or delay 
claim payments.129 Licensing is designed to ensure that market 
actors have sufficient expertise and resources to advise and in-
 
 126. See Donald Cleasby & Nancy M. Schroeder, Regulatory Reform: The 
Consequences of “Baby Steps”, 18 J. INS. REG. 288, 292–93 (2000). 
 127. See id. at 292 (distinguishing between regulation of personal and 
commercial lines of insurance). The primary role of regulation in commercial 
lines of insurance is solvency regulation. Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing 
Consumer Financial Products Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Entities of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Regulatory 
Restructuring] (statement of Gary E. Hughes, Exec. Vice President & General 
Counsel, American Council of Life Insurers). This role for insurance regulation 
can be justified as a credible commitment device for insurers. See infra text 
accompanying notes 145–46, 187–90. 
 128. Many states review and preapprove insurers’ policy forms. This 
process is designed to protect consumers from unfair or surprising terms that 
may result from the adhesive nature of insurance policies. See Schwarcz, su-
pra note 115, at 1424. With respect to insurers’ pricing, most states require 
insurers in some consumer lines of insurance, particularly homeowners and 
auto insurance, to have rate changes approved by state regulators, though the 
degree and intrusiveness of this regulation differs dramatically among states. 
See infra text accompanying notes 223–31. 
 129. Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case 
Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 
83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 745 (2009) (discussing the law’s role in preventing impro-
per practices of insurers). Every state has an Unfair Claims Practices Act that 
gives the state regulator authority to impose fees or issue cease-and-desist or-
ders in cases of flagrant or repeated unfair claims practices. Id. at 750 & n.65. 
Unfair claims practices include a wide range of potential conduct, such as fail-
ing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation, knowingly 
misrepresenting facts or policy terms, and failing to effectuate prompt, fair, 
and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has become 
reasonably clear. KATHLEEN HEALD ETTINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REG-
ULATION 90–97 (1995).  
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sure policyholders.130 And even solvency regulation is primarily 
defended on the grounds that it protects policyholders from the 
risk that insurers will not have the financial strength to pay fu-
ture claims.131 This stands in stark contrast with prudential 
regulation in banking (known as “safety and soundness” regu-
lation), which is primarily justified not by consumer protection 
rationales, but by the need to limit bank runs and other forms 
of systemic risk.132  
This section analyzes whether insurers operating in con-
sumer-oriented markets would choose among competing regu-
lators in a way that promoted the interests of policyholders. It 
first shows that this depends largely on the extent to which in-
surance consumers would know, and rationally respond to, in-
surers’ choices among competing regulators. It then shows that 
most insurance consumers in a scheme of regulatory competi-
tion would be unlikely to be sophisticated about insurers’ regu-
latory choices. Additionally, this section also raises the possibil-
ity that allowing insurers to choose among different regulators 
may itself undermine the commitment function of consumer 
protections, even if insurers’ consumers were fully informed 
and rational about the selection of a regulatory regime. 
In sum, this section therefore suggests that insurers would 
choose among competing regulators in much the same way that 
many claim banks have chosen among competing regulators in 
credit card markets: by selecting the least intrusive regime 
available.133 In large part, this is because the intended benefi-
ciaries of insurance regulation are ordinary consumers rather 
than the relatively sophisticated intended beneficiaries of cor-
porate and securities law.  
 
 130. ETTINGER ET AL., supra note 129, at 174–89 (explaining the licensing 
process and requirements).  
 131. See Regulatory Restructuring, supra note 127 (“The primary objective 
of insurance regulation is solvency, which is the most important consumer 
protection of all.”). But see infra Part II.B.2. Solvency regulation establishes 
guarantee funds and limits the investments that insurers can make, the capi-
tal they can deploy, and the accounting methods they can use. See Steven W. 
Pottier & David W. Sommer, The Effectiveness of Public and Private Sector 
Summary Risk Measures in Predicting Insurer Insolvencies, 21 J. FIN. SERV. 
RES. 101, 103–04 (2000) (listing these goals as factors in measuring risk of in-
solvency).  
 132. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 112–14 (providing background on 
this type of regulation). 
 133. See text accompanying notes 86–90. 
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1. The Character of Insurers’ Regulatory Demand 
a. Policyholder Sophistication About Insurers’ Regulatory 
Choices 
Insurers’ demand for competing regulators would be driven 
largely by policyholders’ demand for competing insurers. In 
particular, insurers’ regulatory choices would depend largely on 
how sophisticated their policyholders were about those regula-
tory choices.134 If policyholders were “unsophisticated” about in-
surers’ regulatory choices—either because they were unaware 
of these choices or failed to appreciate their implications—then 
insurers would demand regulatory regimes with minimalist 
consumer protections. Such a regime would decrease insurers’ 
regulatory compliance costs and maximize their choices of 
business strategies without any substantial offsetting cost in 
policyholder demand. To be sure, it is possible that consumers 
would also benefit from the selection of a deregulatory regime, 
as their premiums would likely decrease.135 But the key point 
here is that insurers with policyholders who were unsophisti-
cated about regulatory choice would favor deregulatory regimes 
irrespective of consumers’ interests.136  
At least two objections can be levied against the prediction 
that insurers would inevitably choose the least restrictive regu-
latory regime if their consumers were unsophisticated about 
their regulatory choices. First, although consumer protections 
limit individual insurers’ range of permissible actions, they can 
nonetheless promote industry interests by solving collective ac-
tion and coordination problems.137 For instance, consumer pro-
tections may protect the industry’s overall reputation from the 
actions of “bad apple” insurers who would ignore the industry-
wide reputational costs of their own misfeasance.138 Similarly, 
 
 134. Cf. Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 74 (rejecting the single license pro-
posal of Butler and Ribstein because “a key reason for insurance regulation is 
consumers’ asymmetric and imperfect information”). 
 135. See Harrington, supra note 9, at 22–30. 
 136. Cf. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 16 (noting that regulatory 
competition is a “procedural mechanism that will tend to contribute to more 
efficient regulations” by harnessing the power of the markets). 
 137. The related argument that other forms of regulation aside from con-
sumer protections may benefit insurers is addressed infra Part II.B.1.  
 138. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 7 (2d ed. 2008) (describ-
ing the race to the bottom that occurred due to insurer-side adverse selection 
in the fire insurance market in the late nineteenth century); Daniel Schwarcz, 
Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer Insur-
ance Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723, 742–45 (2009) (arguing that a similar 
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consumer protections may increase overall demand for insur-
ance by warranting that all available coverage meets certain 
minimum standards, thereby reducing consumer search 
costs.139 If consumer protections benefit insurers, then insurers 
might select robust regulatory regimes irrespective of their 
consumers’ knowledge. 
Interestingly, though, the fact that consumer protections 
might benefit insurers’ collective interests does not undermine 
the prediction that insurers competing in a market comprised 
of policyholders who were unsophisticated about regulatory 
choice would demand minimalist regulation.140 This is because 
insurers who were choosing among competing regulatory re-
gimes would ignore, or at least largely discount, these potential 
industry-wide benefits of consumer protection in choosing 
among competing regulators. These industry-wide benefits 
from consumer protections arise from the capacity of consumer 
protections to solve collective action problems by limiting the 
permissible range of choices available to individual insurers. 
But regulatory choice—at least when it is not tethered to firms’ 
geographic sales or operations141—eliminates these collective 
action benefits from regulation. It does so because it is unable 
to prevent individual firms from “cheating” from the collective 
optimum by defecting to (i.e., choosing) a competing regulator. 
In other words, regulatory choice is a fundamentally unstable 
solution to prisoner’s dilemma games, because it cannot pre-
vent cheating by individual players.  
The second objection is that insurers might choose a rela-
tively robust regulatory regime to improve the coverage they 
offer to consumers. Even if consumers were not directly aware 
 
race to the bottom may characterize insurers’ claims handling practices in the 
current market). Even policyholders who were unsophisticated about specific 
insurers’ regulatory choices might be influenced by media reports or other sto-
ries about insurers’ bad practices. See id. at 740. 
 139. MARTIN F. GRACE & ROBERT W. KLEIN, THE EFFECTS OF AN OPTIONAL 
FEDERAL CHARTER ON COMPETITION IN THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 26–29 
(2007) (considering consumer benefits of regulation and stating that many in-
surers have expressed a desire for increased regulation). 
 140. As is true of all the analysis in Parts II and III, this assumes that 
there are no “safeguards” in place to prevent this result. In particular, it as-
sumes that firms are not required to pay for the consequences of other firms’ 
insolvencies via guarantee funds and are not charged actuarially fair prices for 
deposit insurance. These safeguards, and their potential effectiveness at in-
ducing firms to seek out improved regulation, are addressed separately in Part 
IV. 
 141. See supra text accompanying notes 34–38.  
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of their insurer’s regulatory choice, they might nonetheless be 
indirectly responsive to the improvements that resulted from 
that choice. The key problem with this objection, though, is that 
it inverts the usual logic of regulatory competition—that prin-
cipals can monitor and discipline regulatory choices even when 
they cannot monitor the behavior that is subject to that regula-
tion.142 This inversion ultimately supports the absence of any 
consumer protection regulation whatsoever, rather than regu-
latory competition.143  
Although insurers would inevitably pursue weak consumer 
protections if their consumers were uninformed about their 
regulatory choices, the converse is not necessarily true. In fact, 
insurers might pursue inefficiently lax consumer protection re-
gimes even if their consumers were sophisticated about insur-
ers’ regulatory choices.144 For informed and sophisticated poli-
cyholders, a key benefit of consumer protections is that they 
enhance the credibility of insurers’ commitments.145 The se-
quential and contingent nature of insurance means that even 
insurers that want to commit to paying claims in the future 
may have difficulty doing so, especially in markets (such as life 
insurance) where commitments are long term.146 Most potential 
 
 142. See Romano, supra note 74, at 2367 (“[A] theoretical need for govern-
ment regulation to prevent market failure is not equivalent to a need for a 
monopolist regulator.”). Even if market forces are insufficient to protect insur-
eds against risks such as unfair claims handling and exploitive policy forms, 
Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1403–12, it does not necessarily follow that they 
are insufficient to effectively constrain insurers’ choices among competing reg-
ulators.  
 143. As I have argued at length elsewhere, there are good reasons for con-
sumer protections in insurance. Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 726–27. Indeed, 
defenders of regulatory competition in its most robust forms argue that it of-
fers a procedural mechanism that increases the chances of reaching the effi-
cient substantive outcome whatever the nature of that outcome. See O’HARA & 
RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 199–215. 
 144. But see GRACE & KLEIN, supra note 139, at 3 (“Some have expressed 
concerns that an OFC would lead to competition between federal and state 
regulators that would ultimately degrade rather than improve insurance regu-
lation. However, we argue that if good regulation benefits consumers and they 
value these benefits, then insurers will be motivated to seek optimal regulato-
ry jurisdictions that would increase rather than diminish firm value.”); Butler 
& Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40. 
 145. Other explanations for consumer protections do not substantially ben-
efit informed consumers who do not need regulatory protections to locate an 
insurer that offers the coverage they desire. See Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 
725–26 (contrasting sophisticated and ordinary consumers).  
 146. David Moss, Risk, Responsibility, and the Role of Government, 56 
DRAKE L. REV. 541, 546–48 (2008) (noting the import of commitment problems 
to the government’s role in insurance markets); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” 
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options for making credible commitments—such as investing 
heavily in a brand or acquiring ratings from private entities—
are imperfect. Regulation can supplement these commitment 
devices with the prospect of legal sanctions in the event of bro-
ken commitments.  
Regulatory competition of the type envisioned in OFC and 
SLS schemes could undermine this commitment device by al-
lowing insurers to switch regulators in the future. For instance, 
an insurer looking to make a credible long-term commitment to 
policyholders by selecting a stringent financial regulator would 
be unable to do so, because it would always have the option of 
changing its selection in the future. This problem could likely 
be remedied by allowing firms to commit to a particular regula-
tory regime. But doing so might undermine some of the osten-
sible benefits of regulatory competition in the first place and 
raise a host of practical issues.  
b. The Requisite Degree of Policyholder Sophistication About 
Insurers’ Regulatory Choices 
Predicting the nature of insurers’ choices among competing 
regulatory regimes is complicated by the fact that potential po-
licyholders are neither completely informed nor completely un-
informed about those choices. In reality, some insurance pur-
chasers in a scheme of regulatory competition would be 
“sophisticated” about insurers’ regulatory choices, and others 
would not be. Assessing what level of consumer sophistication 
would correspond to what percentage of insurers pursuing poli-
cyholder interests in their regulatory choices is a complicated 
and speculative enterprise.  
Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that a small percentage 
of sophisticated consumers could discipline a large percentage 
of insurers to select a robust regulatory scheme.147 Ironically, 
 
Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 418–19 
(1996) (discussing commitment problems associated with the prompt and fair 
payment of claims).  
 147. The “informed minority” argument is important in contract law. R. 
Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of the In-
formed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 
646–48 (1998); see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information 
in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security In-
terests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1983). Much of the analysis is identical for 
choice of regulators in a scheme of regulatory competition, which can itself be 
understood simply as one type of choice that could be contractually specified. 
As such, it is hardly surprising that defenders of regulatory competition in-
voke the informed minority argument to argue that firms will make choices 
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this is partially due to the intense price competition that char-
acterizes most consumer insurance markets.148 Insurers that 
select a less intrusive regulatory regime will enjoy a competi-
tive advantage over other insurers in attracting the business of 
unsophisticated consumers, as they could partially pass on to 
these consumers the cost savings associated with lax regula-
tion. Unlike sophisticated consumers, who would decide wheth-
er they were willing to pay higher premiums for enhanced con-
sumer protections, “unsophisticated” consumers would tend to 
purchase their coverage from these low-cost insurers irrespec-
tive of their actual willingness to pay for consumer protections. 
That is because only one side of the relevant tradeoff—the de-
crease in premiums—would be visible to those consumers.  
The experience of fire insurance companies in the late ni-
neteenth century is illustrative. In the absence of form regula-
tion, fire insurers that sold highly limited coverage began to 
drive other fire insurers with more comprehensive coverage out 
of the marketplace, as consumers could not differentiate the 
quality of coverage that these competing insurers offered and 
so based their purchasing decisions largely on price. The result-
ing fire insurance coverage was riddled with exceptions, result-
ing in largely illusory coverage for many policyholders until 
states adopted a mandatory fire insurance policy.149 Similarly, 
price regulation in insurance markets was originally justified 
as a way of ensuring that insurance prices did not become too 
low to support policy payments due to “ruinous” price competi-
tion.150 Such ruinous competition allegedly resulted in the fail-
ures of insurance companies from the San Francisco Earth-
quake of 1908 to Hurricane Andrew of 1994 precisely because 
most consumers, unaware of their insurers’ financial strength, 
 
that are consonant with their consumers’ preferences. See, e.g., O’HARA & 
RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 35. 
 148. See Jeffrey R. Brown & Austan Goolsbee, Does the Internet Make Mar-
kets More Competitive? Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry, 110 J. POL. 
ECON. 481, 482–83 (2002) (term life); J. David Cummins, Property-Liability 
Insurance Price Deregulation: The Last Bastion?, in DEREGULATING PROPER-
TY-LIABILITY INSURANCE 2–3 (J. David Cummins ed., 2002) (property-
liability); Paul T. Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-
Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 375, 391 (1973) 
(property-liability). 
 149. See BAKER, supra note 138, at 7 (explaining the relationship in the 
market between limited coverage, or “lemon,” and comprehensive coverage, or 
“peach,” fire insurance policies).  
 150. See MEIER, supra note 38, at 60–73 (chronicling the historical devel-
opment of insurance regulation). 
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gravitated to the cheapest coverage available.151 Although in-
surers have used this argument to justify collusive pricing, the 
underlying concern is legitimate.152 
In sum, whether market forces would effectively discipline 
insurers’ choices among competing regulators depends largely 
on the extent to which insurance consumers would know, and 
rationally respond to, insurers’ choices among competing regu-
lators. Regulatory competition may degrade consumer protec-
tions even if policyholders are generally informed about regula-
tory choices. But regulatory competition is sure to produce 
weaker consumer protections to the extent that most consum-
ers are ill-informed about their insurers’ regulatory choices.  
2. Consumer Sophistication and Insurer Regulatory Demand 
Determining how well-informed insurance consumers 
would be about insurers’ choices of regulators in a scheme of 
regulatory competition is fundamentally a prediction about 
consumer information in a hypothetical market setting. But the 
basic features of both personal property/casualty lines and life 
insurance markets provide strong reason to believe that a sub-
stantial majority of consumers would not meaningfully take in-
to account insurers’ choices of regulatory regimes in making 
their purchasing decisions. First, and most importantly, there 
is little reason to expect that consumers would be familiar with 
the information necessary to meaningfully evaluate insurers’ 
choices of regulatory regimes. Second, even consumers armed 
with this information would have a limited capacity to use it to 
make informed purchasing decisions. This section considers 
each reason in turn. 
a. Information and Regulatory Choice 
Consumers must know more than simply the identity of an 
insurer’s choice of regulator in order to evaluate that choice.153 
Without a sense of the relative quality of different regulators’ 
consumer protections, consumers would have no basis for in-
terpreting an insurer’s selection of a regulator. Yet the charac-
 
 151. See id. at 59–60 (describing the former). 
 152. See MEIER, supra note 38, at 59–60; Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 
54–57. 
 153. Any scheme of regulatory competition would presumably be accompa-
nied by a requirement that insurers disclose their chosen regulator. See, e.g., 
Romano, supra note 74, at 2413 (proposing that firms would need to disclose 
which regulator they selected). 
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ter of consumers’ insurance purchases makes it very unlikely 
that a substantial percentage of consumers would consider and 
be able to interpret this information when choosing among 
competing insurers. 
First, consumers choosing among competing insurers gen-
erally conduct only minimally time consuming and cognitively 
taxing independent research that does not rely on market in-
termediaries such as insurance agents. The majority of con-
sumers in automobile and homeowner insurance markets re-
port that family and friends are their primary source of 
information about competing insurers.154 Other common 
sources of information, including insurance company literature, 
advertisements, television, and the yellow pages, similarly re-
quire minimal research and effort from consumers.155 Recently, 
more consumers also report using internet platforms such as 
einsurance.com in selecting among competing insurers.156 By 
contrast, a very small percentage of insurance consumers re-
port conducting more extensive independent research of com-
peting insurers: only three percent report consulting state gov-
ernment hotlines and only seven percent report using 
consumer-oriented magazines.157 Perhaps even more notably, 
such consumers generally found these sources of information 
 
 154. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable 
Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 311 (1998) (citing INS. RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 1995 at 15 fig.2-7, 31 fig.2-27 and giving 
data that fifty-one percent of homeowner insureds and fifty-four percent of au-
to insureds relied on word of mouth to learn about insurance, more than all 
other sources of information). A similar 2001 study found that, for auto insur-
ance, fifty-six percent of recent consumers relied on the recommendations of 
someone they knew, and ninety-eight percent of them stated that this infor-
mation was somewhat or very valuable. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1413 
(citing INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, Issue 2, at 
6 fig.2-5). As in 1995, insureds did not cite any other source of information as 
frequently as a basis for their decision. Id. Insurance is one arena where such 
advice is usually close to useless, as the vast majority of consumers never use 
the most important features of the insurance that they purchase. Cf. 
Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 737–38 (discussing consumer behaviors). For 
that reason, it is hardly surprising that virtually all consumers report being 
satisfied with their auto and homeowners insurance. See Schwarcz, supra note 
115, at 1413. 
 155. See Thomas, supra note 154, at 313.  
 156. See Randy E. Dumm & Robert E. Hoyt, Insurance Distribution Chan-
nels: Markets in Transition, 22 J. INS. REG. 27, 28 (2003) (noting that the in-
ternet channel “was growing at an explosive rate”). 
 157. See Thomas, supra note 154, at 312–14 (providing 1995 data).  
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less useful than more accessible sources of information, such as 
advice from friends and family.158 
When consumers do conduct independent research, they 
focus principally on price. One recent study found that only ten 
percent of automobile insurance customers reported selecting a 
carrier that did not offer the lowest price.159 Price distinctions 
are obviously easy for consumers to understand and compare. 
Consumers who choose among competing carriers for reasons 
other than price do not generally do so because their indepen-
dent research has revealed relevant nonprice information. Ra-
ther, they do so because they personally received poor service 
or experienced a claims problem.160  
The evidence from life insurance markets largely mirrors 
the evidence from property/casualty markets. Studies of life in-
surance purchasing decisions prior to the advent of the Internet 
tended to find that the vast majority of consumers did not com-
parison shop or read literature other than that provided by 
their insurers. In one study of 194 respondents, none reported 
reviewing independent financial strength ratings in purchasing 
their coverage, two reported consulting popular press like Con-
sumer Reports, and one reported contacting the state insurance 
commissioner.161 The overwhelming majority of survey respon-
dents chose a life insurer based on the recommendations of oth-
ers.162 More recent research finds a significant amount of com-
parison shopping based on price in the term life insurance 
market, which has helped to lower premiums substantially. 
However, it finds limited evidence of such comparison shopping 
in the whole life insurance markets, where products are much 
more complicated and heterogeneous.163 
 
 158. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1413, 1416 (citing INS. RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, Issue 2, at 6 fig.2-5 that ninety-
eight percent found useful information from family and friends compared to 
only ninety percent for that from insurance agents). 
 159. See J.D. POWER & ASSOCS., 2009 INSURANCE SHOPPING STUDY, http:// 
www.jdpower.com/insurance/articles/2009-Insurance-Shopping-Study; see also 
Dumm & Hoyt, supra note 156, at 35 fig.1 (citing 2001 survey by J.D. Power 
and Associates indicating that cost savings may not greatly influence decision 
making). 
 160. See Dumm & Hoyt, supra note 156, at 36 fig.2 (noting thirty-four per-
cent were “event-driven”). 
 161. See Roger A. Formisano et al., Choice Strategies in Difficult Task En-
vironments, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 474, 476 (1982). 
 162. See id. at 477. 
 163. See Brown & Goolsbee, supra note 148, at 503.  
  
2010] AGAINST REGULATORY COMPETITION 1745 
 
Consumers’ general lack of effort in independently re-
searching competing insurers is hardly surprising given the 
circumstances under which they tend to select among compet-
ing insurers. Nonprice distinctions among competing insurers 
are complex, contingent, and difficult to interpret.164 Yet first-
time decisions among competing insurers are generally made 
during eventful and stressful times in peoples’ lives.165 In the 
property/casualty context, consumers first select a carrier when 
they buy a home or automobile, or move.166 First-time life in-
surance decisions are often made when people take a new job or 
have a sudden change in family structure. And once consumers 
select an insurer, they tend not to switch unless they can save a 
substantial amount of money from doing so.167  
The second reason why consumers’ purchasing decisions 
would be unlikely to reflect insurers’ regulatory decisions is 
that market intermediaries could not be relied upon to advise 
consumers about this issue. Only a small percentage of con-
sumers in life insurance markets and about half in proper-
ty/casualty lines now purchase insurance through independent 
agents. Instead, consumer markets are increasingly populated 
by captive agents and direct writers, who only offer coverage 
with a single insurer. This distribution mechanism tends to 
produce cost savings that can be passed on to consumers, but it 
eliminates expert advice about choosing among competing car-
riers.168 Even consumers who do purchase insurance through 
independent agents often receive slanted advice about compet-
ing insurers.169 Most independent insurance agents receive con-
 
 164. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 77 (2008) (“The 
benefits from holding insurance are delayed, the probability of having a claim 
is hard to analyze, consumers do not get useful feedback on whether they are 
getting a good return on their insurance purchases, and mapping from what 
they are buying to what they are getting can be ambiguous.”). 
 165. Consumers making decisions under these circumstances rationally 
“adopt simple choice strategies” that balance “the desire to achieve accuracy 
with the desire to minimize effort.” Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, 
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 
1223–34 (2003).  
 166. See Dumm & Hoyt, supra note 156, at 36 fig.2 (noting thirty-four per-
cent were “event-driven”).  
 167. See id. at 34. 
 168. See Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Insurance Distribution Sys-
tems, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 709, 712–17 tbls.1 & 3 (Georges Dionne 
ed., 2000) (16.4% and 49.7%, respectively).  
 169. See Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Con-
tingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 296–303 (2007) (discuss-
ing these agents “inefficient steering” to suboptimal plans).  
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tingent commission payments or other forms of differential 
compensation from insurers based on the amount of business 
they direct to the insurer.170 These payments create incentives 
for independent agents to steer consumers to specific insurers 
who pay the highest kickback and to consolidate their clients 
with a limited number of insurers.171 They consequently un-
dermine the extent to which independent agents can be relied 
upon to offer objective advice about competing carriers. 
Third, and finally, neither advertising nor disclosure re-
quirements could be expected to meaningfully inform a large 
percentage of consumers about insurers’ regulatory choices. In-
formation about the relative quality of different jurisdictions’ 
consumer protections is both controversial and complex. Its 
complexity means that, in order to be effective, any disclosure 
regime or advertising campaign would need to discuss the un-
derlying issues by boiling them down to simplistic metrics or 
slogans.172 This is entirely possible, of course—rating agencies 
such as A.M. Best have developed letter grades that are in-
tended to reflect the financial health of individual insurers.173 
But in contrast to financial ratings, where there is substantial 
agreement at least with respect to the basics,174 any rating of a 
jurisdiction’s regulatory “quality” could be immensely subjec-
tive, depending in large part on the political philosophy of the 
entity doing the rating.175 As a result, different ratings organi-
 
 170. See Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 727–32 (elaborating on these com-
pensation schemes). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Prod-
ucts Liability—Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 
495, 511–16 (1976) (“Warnings, in order to be effective, must be selective.”).  
 173. Cf. Tom Baker & David Moss, Government as Risk Manager, in NEW 
PRINCIPLES ON REGULATION 99 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009), 
(discussing government standards and private marketing slogans that convey 
complex messages simply). 
 174. The “rating process involves a comprehensive quantitative and qualit-
ative analysis of a company’s balance sheet strength, operating performance 
and business profile. This includes comparisons to peers and industry stan-
dards as well as assessments of operating plans, philosophy and manage-
ment.” A.M. Best, Best’s Credit Rating Methodology, http://www.ambest.com/ 
ratings/methodology.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). 
 175. Some have tried to rate the enforcement of different countries’ corpo-
rate and securities law. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. 
POL. ECON. 1113, 1115 (1998). But rating the content of the laws themselves is 
an entirely different matter from rating enforcement efforts, where factors 
such as the number of enforcement actions can be used to generate quantita-
tive metrics. Id. at 1140. Moreover, these ratings have themselves been sharp-
ly criticized by many scholars. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Kon Sik Kim, Es-
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zations could easily have largely inconsistent ratings of differ-
ent regulators, and challenging the accuracy of these different 
ratings would be costly and difficult.  
Ultimately, of course, the percentage of consumer-
policyholders who would be familiar with their insurer’s regula-
tory selection would depend on numerous factors. These include 
the specific insurance market at issue, the number of compet-
ing regulators, and the extent to which any of these regulators 
invested in developing a particular reputation with consumers 
and/or insurers. But this section gives good reason to be skep-
tical that a substantial percentage of policyholders would be so 
informed, given the manner in which consumers shop for in-
surance and the complex and subjective nature of the underly-
ing information.  
b. Consumer Decisionmaking and Regulatory Choice 
Even if consumers were reasonably well-informed about 
the relative quality of insurers’ choices of regulatory regimes, 
they would have substantial difficulties in assessing the impli-
cations of those choices for their own purchasing decisions. 
Consumers only care about an insurers’ regulatory regime inso-
far as it provides them with better coverage or lower costs. But 
the relationship between insurance regulation and these two 
variables—particularly the former—is complicated and con-
testable.176 It requires an appreciation of the risks involved in 
insurance transactions, and the extent to which regulation ef-
fectively mitigates those risks.177 Simply put, many consumers 
do not have this appreciation of insurance regulation.  
Not only would consumers have difficulty mapping insur-
ers’ regulatory choices into substantive outcomes, but they 
would be prone to underestimating the benefits that enhanced 
regulation could produce in terms of better coverage.178 Beha-
 
tablishing a New Stock Market for Shareholder Value Oriented Firms in Ko-
rea, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 277, 281–82 (2002). 
 176. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 164, at 75–76 (describing this as 
mapping from choices to outcomes).  
 177. It is for precisely this reason that regulators still regulate insurers’ 
solvency and organize guarantee funds even though it is relatively easy for 
consumers to get objective measures of different insurers’ financial strength. 
See supra note 174. 
 178. There is a substantial body of literature documenting the fact that 
there is a “systematic tendency for insurance in practice to differ from insur-
ance in theory.” David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory 
to Meet the Practice of Insurance 3 (Harvard Univ., Working Paper 2004); see 
also Howard Kunreuther & Mark V. Pauly, Rules Rather Than Discretion: 
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vioral research reveals that individuals systematically underes-
timate the likelihood that they will suffer an insurable loss. 
Studies have repeatedly shown that people are ordinarily over-
ly optimistic that they will not be injured in an earthquake,179 
be involved in a car accident,180 suffer from health problems,181 
or die young.182 Such over-optimism “is a pervasive feature of 
human life” in general.183 Of course, competing factors—such as 
recent events that make bad outcomes particularly available—
can push probability estimates in the other direction. But over-
optimism tends to be a robust phenomenon that has been re-
peatedly documented in insurance decisions in particular. Such 
over-optimism produces an artificially depressed assessment of 
the value of regulatory protections, which only matter when, 
and if, consumers suffer a loss.  
 
Lessons from Hurricane Katrina (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. W12503, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=927387. Much of this literature is of limited applicability to the 
problems in this Article for two reasons. First, the normative implications of 
these departures from rational actor models are not always clear. Although 
government policy clearly ought to respond to simple errors in insurance deci-
sion making, such as underestimation of risks, many behavioral anomalies are 
not so easily described as errors, rather than preferences. See Daniel 
Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance, ERASMUS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572908 (arguing 
that consumer deviations from expected utility theory in the insurance realm 
are often the results of mistakes, but that these deviations can also frequently 
be explained as sophisticated behavior). Second, many behavioral anomalies 
would have an ambiguous impact on how consumers would evaluate insurers’ 
regulatory choices in a system of regulatory competition.  
 179. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization 
of Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reac-
tions to the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 39, 40–41 (1992). 
 180. David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of 
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, 57 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1082, 1082 (2006); Ola Svenson, Are We All 
Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLO-
GICA 143, 147 (1981). 
 181. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 (1980).  
 182. See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law 
Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2, 23 (2001).  
 183. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 164, at 31–33 (noting that such 
“unrealistic optimism . . . characterizes most people in most social categories”). 
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B. REGULATORY DEMAND AND OTHER BENEFICIARIES OF 
INSURANCE REGULATION 
Although consumers are the primary intended beneficia-
ries of insurance regulation, they are not the only such benefi-
ciaries. At least two other potential groups of beneficiaries ex-
ist: insurers themselves and third parties outside of the 
insurer/policyholder relationship.184 This section examines 
these potential beneficiaries, looking at the extent to which “in-
surer demand” among competing regulators would promote 
these interests. It first argues that insurer demand would do 
little to promote industry objectives other than reducing regu-
latory costs. It then argues that insurer demand could be ex-
pected to harm the interests of third parties. The protection of 
such third parties is an important goal of insurance regulation 
even though systemic risk is much less substantial in the in-
surance domain than the banking domain.  
1. Insurers as Beneficiaries of Insurance Regulation 
Financial regulation is often claimed to benefit the regu-
lated industry itself, as well as that industry’s consumers and 
investors.185 Frequently, such claims are premised on the idea 
that consumer protections benefit financial firms by solving col-
lective action or commitment problems.186 Section A showed 
why individual insurers’ preferences among competing regula-
tory regimes could not be expected to promote these goals.187 In 
short, regulatory solutions to collective action problems typical-
ly require that those solutions are mandatory. By giving insur-
ers choice as to their regulatory scheme, regulatory competition 
allows individual insurers to cheat from the collective opti-
mum.188 Regulatory competition would also be unlikely to solve 
 
 184. See generally Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Finan-
cial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 333–34 
(1999) (identifying financial regulation as primarily concerned with regulating 
risk and protecting consumers/investors and third parties). 
 185. See Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foun-
dation, WASH. POST, June 15, 2009, at A15 (describing the Obama Adminis-
tration’s framework for regulatory modernization of banking, and noting that 
such modernization is in the industry’s own interest because it will restore the 
public’s trust in the financial system). 
 186. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 129, at 810 (promoting an independent 
dispute resolution entity for consumer insurance lines, and arguing that it 
would enhance the insurance industry’s reputation among consumers by re-
stricting the capacity of insurers to unfairly limit or delay claim payments). 
 187. See supra Part II.A. 
 188. See supra text accompanying notes 137–43. 
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commitment problems given the prospect that an insurer could 
change regulatory regimes in the future.189 
However, regulation can also promote the interests of regu-
lated entities in more obvious ways. Regulators are sometimes 
uniquely situated to provide direct services or products to regu-
lated entities. In some cases, this is because regulators can ex-
ploit economies of scale and avoid coordination problems asso-
ciated with certain services.190 Consider the banking sphere, 
where these considerations prompt the Federal Reserve to pro-
vide private banks with check-clearing, wire-transfer, and au-
tomated clearinghouse transaction services.191 In other cases, 
regulators may be well situated to help develop products be-
cause of their distinctive expertise, ability to identify common 
problems, and obvious ability to navigate regulatory hurdles. 
This helps to explain why state bank regulators have them-
selves developed widely used bank products such as negotiable 
order of withdrawal accounts.192 Arguably, modern corporate 
law provides another example of such a regulatory service, with 
Delaware courts opining at length about voluntary best prac-
tices for corporate governance.193 
Although insurers’ regulatory demand might promote regu-
lators’ provision of direct services to insurers,194 this is not an 
important element of insurance regulation. The reason is that 
 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 143–46. 
 190. Regulation that facilitates industry coordination should be distin-
guished from regulatory efforts to coordinate the process of regulation itself. 
See generally Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordina-
tion, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009).  
 191. See generally Adam J. Levitin, Public-Private Competition in Pay-
ments: The Role of the Federal Reserve (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working 
Paper No. 1420061, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420061 (ar-
guing that the Federal Reserve serves industry interests by introducing com-
petition into the marketplace where none would exist). 
 192. See Wilmarth, supra note 83, at 1156. 
 193. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and 
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 848 (2007); Edward B. Rock, Saints and 
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 
1017 (1997). This form of best practices arguably also exists in securities law. 
For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that a public company can 
adopt a code of ethics for senior financial officers and have a financial expert 
on its audit committee, but can also opt-out of these requirements. 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7264–7265 (2006). 
 194. Even here it is possible that externalities and economies of scale may, 
in fact, mean that such services are best provided through a single monopolis-
tic regulator. See Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, 
in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 17, at 
30, 36–37. 
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industry associations already do an excellent job of providing 
these services.195 The most important example is the Insurance 
Services Office (ISO), which facilitates the drafting of standard 
insurance policies and the collection of aggregate loss data.196 
Other examples include the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, 
which serves as a national clearinghouse for information about 
insurance fraud,197 and the Insurance Marketplace Standards 
Association, which develops best practices for life insurers.198 
The success of industry associations in providing products 
and services that might not otherwise arise in the marketplace 
is not a coincidence. Rather, it is a product of the insurance in-
dustry’s distinctive history. The insurance industry has been 
largely exempt from federal antitrust laws since the McCarran 
Ferguson Act was passed in 1945.199 This has allowed private 
industry associations to play a large role in identifying common 
issues and coordinating activities without facing significant an-
titrust scrutiny.200 At the same time, insurance regulators have 
historically been poorly situated to facilitate industry coordina-
tion because those regulators have themselves been uncoordi-
 
 195. Coordination in securities is also significantly facilitated by private 
associations. First, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, a private asso-
ciation, sets accounting rules for public disclosures that are adhered to in most 
states. See Romano, supra note 74, at 2394. Second, exchanges set various 
trading rules that are forms of regulation. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Se-
curities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government 
Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 153 (2008). 
 196. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 34 (4th 
ed. 2005). Insurers derive substantial value from these services. Aggregating 
loss data allows them to more accurately price their policies and evaluate their 
exposures to different risks, because it gives them a larger and, therefore, 
more reliable data set. Such data pooling would be virtually impossible were it 
not for the coordination of policy forms among insurers. This contributes to the 
accuracy of data sharing, by ensuring that the underlying loss data is relative-
ly comparable across companies. See id. at 33–34; see also Helping Insurers 
Price Their Products, http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISO-Services-for-Property 
-Casualty-Insurance/Helping-Insurers-Price-Their-Products.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2010). 
 197. About the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, http://www.insurance 
fraud.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). 
 198. Insurance Marketplace Standards, Association Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.imsaethics.org/Content/FAQs_47.aspx (last visited Jan. 
15, 2010).  
 199. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 14–27.  
 200. Id. at 47–48. Indeed, such industry groups occasionally went too far in 
the past, conspiring both to fix prices in conjunction with the sharing of actu-
arial data and to boycott insurers who refused to move to a claims made policy 
form. Id. at 64–65.  
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nated.201 State regulators’ historical lack of coordination helped 
induce the industry to develop strong and active industry asso-
ciations to allow individual insurers to navigate this patchwork 
regulatory system.202 This, in turn, has allowed industry asso-
ciations to take on roles that might otherwise not be efficiently 
provided in markets without regulatory competition.  
2. Externalities and Third-Party Beneficiaries of Insurance 
Regulation 
As noted in Part I, there is virtually no reason to expect 
that regulated entities would select regulators that provided 
the optimal measure of protections to third parties or larger so-
cial interests.203 These positive externalities of regulation are 
costly to regulated entities and, unlike consumer protections, 
provide them with virtually no potential benefit.  
Insurance regulation is at least partially intended to bene-
fit third parties to the insurance transaction as well as con-
sumers and insurers.204 For instance, regulations promoting 
the payment of liability insurance claims protect accident vic-
tims as well as policyholders.205 Regulations in the property in-
surance sphere shield neighborhoods and families from the 
consequences of destroyed homes and businesses.206 And the 
regulation of virtually all forms of insurance helps to keep indi-
viduals from relying on publicly funded social insurance pro-
grams, such as bankruptcy, social security, and unemployment 
insurance.207  
 
 201. Cf. id. at 72–74 (describing different state regulatory schemes). 
 202. See Brown, supra note 23, at 4–6 (describing the lack of coordination in 
state regulation); see also Helping Insurers Comply with Legal and Regulatory 
Requirements, http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISO-Services-for-Property-Casualty 
-Insurance/Helping-Insurers-Comply-with-Legal-and-Regulatory-Requirements 
.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). 
 203. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 204. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social In-
strument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2010) 
(arguing that “insurance policies are not merely contracts but also are de-
signed to perform particular risk management deterrence, and compensation 
functions important to economic and social ordering”). 
 205. See BAKER, supra note 138, at 8, 642. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social 
Insurance, and Tort Reform: Towards a New Vision of Compensation for Ill-
ness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 94–96 (1993) (describing the interac-
tions between public and private insurance programs). 
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Insurance regulation also serves a broader set of social in-
terests in fairness that are not fully captured by the self-
interests of consumers and insurers. For instance, regulations 
may forbid the use of certain underwriting classifications, such 
as gender, race, and genetics.208 Underlying these prohibitions 
is a judgment that people ought not to be financially responsi-
ble for certain personal characteristics. Furthermore, insurance 
regulation mandates certain types of coverage—such as proper-
ty insurance coverage for innocent co-insureds or life insurance 
coverage for suicides209—at least partially for similar reasons.  
Although insurance regulation is indeed partially designed 
to protect the interests of third parties to the insurance rela-
tionship, this is not a central goal of insurance regulation, as it 
is in the banking context. The reason is that insurance—
defined to exclude “insurance” against losses to credit risks210—
generally does not create substantial systemic risks.211 First, 
and most importantly, insurance failures are not particularly 
contagious because policyholders usually only have a right to 
demand payment on the occurrence of a contractually specified 
event.212 This minimizes the risk of a “run” on an insurer.213 
 
 208. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL 
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 92–93 (1986); cf. Regina Austin, The Insurance 
Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 538–46 (1983) (describing 
the utility of age, sex, and marital data to insurance companies’ calculation of 
risk). 
 209. See generally BAKER, supra note 138, at 25.  
 210. See Henderson, supra note 20, at 2–4. 
 211. See Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Posi-
tion Risk in Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL 
ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 23–24 (Hal 
S. Scott ed., 2005); Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 28 (“With the exception of 
the problems suffered by the American International Group . . . and financial 
guaranty insurers, it is not clear that the insurance industry poses the kind of 
systemic risk to other markets as that posed by banks or other financial insti-
tutions.”); VAUGHAN, supra note 24, at 3 (“The insurance industry is more like-
ly to be the recipient of systemic risk from other economic agents rather than 
the driving force that creates systemic risk.”). 
 212. Life insurers are more susceptible to contagion because life insurance 
products often include savings vehicles from which policyholders can withdraw 
funds. See JERRY, supra note 2, at 31. Even for life insurance products, conta-
gious risks are limited because the most common forms of life insurance—term 
life insurance and basic annuities—do not permit policyholders to withdraw 
funds. Id. at 30. Perhaps more importantly, policyholders conceptualize life 
insurance products differently than they conceptualize demand deposits in 
banks. History bears these distinctions out: there has never been a run on the 
life insurance industry, despite occasional predictions of such runs in the pop-
ular press. See Scott E. Harrington, Policyholder Runs, Life Insurance Com-
pany Failures, and Insurance Solvency Regulation, 15 REG. 27, 30 (1992); cf. 
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Second, unlike credit, the availability and proper functioning of 
insurance is not a prerequisite to most systemically important 
economic activities.214 To the extent that insurance unavailabil-
ity did pose systemic concerns, ex post government intervention 
could relatively easily fix the problem by temporarily reinsur-
ing the risk, or providing the insurance directly.215 Finally, the 
inability of an insurer to pay claims is unlikely to be systemi-
cally significant as insurers naturally avoid concentrated and 
correlated risks. While insurance regulation may be less con-
cerned with protecting third parties than banking regulation, 
such protection is nonetheless an important goal of insurance 
regulation. Yet, it is a goal that insurers’ demand for competing 
regulators would ignore. 
 
Regulatory Modernization: Perspectives on Insurance Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (state-
ment of Martin F. Grace). Even the near collapse of insurance giant AIG has 
not triggered an “insurance run” from AIG itself or from other insurers. See 
Editorial, The Never-Ending Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A26. 
 213. In banking, contagion is triggered by depositors who fear that their 
bank may be financially weak and therefore choose to withdraw their deposits. 
This can devastate even healthy banks. It can also promote contagion, as de-
positors at other banks seek to withdraw funds for fear that their own bank is 
financially weak. See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS 
THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 91 (2002). Banking regulation limits this risk 
by providing deposit insurance, which limits the incentives of wary depositors 
to withdraw their funds. Id. at 118. 
 214. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate 
Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 
1834, 1841 (2007) (suggesting that the purchase of traditional forms of insur-
ance by these companies is somewhat of a mystery, at least when they are 
publicly owned); Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate 
Purchase of Insurance 2 (Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 346, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338336. Thus, while many decried an 
insurance crisis in the mid-1980s, when many forms of insurance suddenly be-
came unavailable, this crisis hardly ravaged the national or world economies. 
See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1522 (1987). To the extent there was any systemic impact, it 
was on certain classes of individuals, such as doctors unable to find medical 
malpractice insurance, rather than on systemically important entities. See id. 
at 1526. 
 215. There is ample precedent for such measures, most notably the Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 103, 116 Stat. 2327 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006 & Supp. 2007)). Such a pro-
gram would not need to be long term because the availability of insurance is 
characterized not by precipitous and self-reinforcing shocks in availability (as 
in banking), but rather by natural cycles of availability. Insurance markets 
routinely cycle between “hard” markets, where coverage is limited and more 
expensive, and “soft markets,” where it is comparatively available and inex-
pensive.  
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III.  REGULATORY SUPPLY AND INSURANCE   
Part II argued that insurers in a scheme of regulatory 
competition would demand minimalist regulatory regimes that 
imposed as few costs and constraints on them as possible. But 
competing regulators would not necessarily supply such a re-
gime. Simply put, competing regulators would have various in-
centives other than attracting insurers to their regime. These 
include generating good publicity, currying favor from political 
and industry interests, avoiding public scandals and, of course, 
following through on their stated regulatory objectives.  
The degree to which “ordinary” political economy factors 
would temper insurers’ demand for deregulation depends cru-
cially on the number of competing regulators. As the number of 
competing regulators increases, so too will the prospect that 
regulatory demand will dominate other regulatory incen-
tives.216 Consequently, while regulatory demand would largely 
determine outcomes in an SLS scheme with fifty competing 
regulators, it would simply supplement other regulatory incen-
tives in an OFC scheme that contained only two competing 
regulators.  
This distinction is crucial, as a limited incentive for regula-
tors to attract competing firms may, in certain contexts, offset 
some of the inefficiencies of regulation without jeopardizing its 
core objectives. This argument is often deployed by defenders of 
the dual banking system.217 In particular, they have argued 
that the dual banking system causes regulators to reduce regu-
latory costs, embrace innovation, and specialize in different 
types of banks.218 At the same time, the dual banking system 
does not undermine the effectiveness of regulation, according to 
its defenders, because regulators must balance their desire to 
attract banks with the political consequences of allowing banks 
to fail.219  
This Part evaluates these arguments in the insurance con-
text, looking at the extent to which limited regulatory competi-
tion, such as that envisioned in the OFC, could improve the 
content of insurance regulation. It focuses on three ways in 
which regulatory demand for decreased regulatory costs may 
theoretically do so. First, section A considers the argument that 
 
 216. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
 217. See Fischel et al., supra note 94, at 335. 
 218. See Miller, supra note 61, at 14–15. 
 219. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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the political economy of insurance regulation means that it is 
naturally prone to excessive intervention in the markets. If so, 
limited regulatory competition may provide a desirable coun-
terweight to this tendency. Focusing on nonsolvency consumer 
protections—the domain most frequently criticized on these 
grounds220—it argues that insurance regulation is structurally 
more susceptible to the opposite problem: insufficient regula-
tion. Regulatory competition would exacerbate this problem ra-
ther than offset it.  
Section B turns to a second regulatory supply argument: 
that regulatory demand can promote more efficient regulation 
without jeopardizing regulatory effectiveness. Here, the prima-
ry target of critics is typically state solvency regulation, at least 
once one sets aside complaints about the duplicative and over-
lapping nature of nonsolvency regulation for multistate insur-
ers.221 While acknowledging that insurance solvency regulation 
is indeed antiquated, section B argues that regulatory competi-
tion is not a good solution to this problem. Rather, it would un-
dermine the most promising approach to modernizing solvency 
regulation and jeopardize a scheme that worked reasonably 
well in the recent financial crisis.  
Finally, section C considers the argument that regulatory 
competition can promote specialization among different regula-
tors. It argues that the status quo already achieves such regu-
latory specialization through cooperation rather than competi-
tion. It also observes that, at least in the property/casualty 
context, the most important form of specialization for regula-
tors—familiarity with local perils and the state tort system—is 
embedded in the status quo. 
A. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND OFFSETTING EXCESSIVE 
REGULATION 
Regulatory competition is often defended on supply-side 
grounds based on the claim that monopolistic regulatory 
schemes tend to be excessive. Regulatory competition, from this 
 
 220. Few commentators argue that state solvency regulation is excessive, 
as most seem to accept the premise that such regulation is sensible, even if it 
could be more efficiently conducted. 
 221. Efficiency complaints about nonsolvency regulations usually involve 
the difficulty of complying with multiple regulatory regimes rather than the 
substantive inefficiencies associated with any particular regulatory approach. 
As noted at the outset, this Article explicitly excludes this issue from analysis 
on the grounds that regulatory competition is not necessary to address this 
problem. 
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perspective, can offset this natural tendency of regulation. At 
the very least, it can give regulated entities a safety valve 
against the worst regulatory excesses. Moreover, regulators’ 
natural inclination to overregulate mitigates the prospect that 
a small number of competing regulators would go too far in 
promoting deregulation to attract regulated entities.222  
Such supply-side arguments are common among propo-
nents of insurance regulatory reform, who often cite price regu-
lation in homeowners and automobile insurance markets to ar-
gue that political forces promote excessive state regulation of 
insurers’ market behavior.223 And a fair reading of the evidence 
supports these claims. Both automobile and homeowners in-
surance premiums are highly salient political issues in certain 
states.224 This political pressure has often generated regulatory 
efforts to prohibit or limit price increases in insurance mar-
kets.225 Yet most economic studies of insurance markets con-
clude that such price regulation results in premiums artificially 
cycling between low and high levels without decreasing con-
sumer costs in the long term.226 The reason is that automobile 
and homeowners insurance markets are naturally quite price 
competitive,227 meaning that artificially low prices must be off-
 
 222. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing these arguments in the banking con-
text). 
 223. See, e.g., Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 74; Klein, Overview, supra 
note 5, at 31; Robert E. Litan & Phil O’Connor, Consumer Benefits of an Op-
tional Federal Charter: The Case of Auto Insurance, in THE FUTURE OF INSUR-
ANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at 145–46; cf. Butler 
& Ribstein, supra note 4, at 38 (“[S]tates . . . [have] the ability and incentive to 
impose inefficient regulation at the behest of local interest groups.”).  
 224. See generally Cummins, supra note 148, at 10–11 (“[A]uto insurance 
prices have been a potent political issue in legislative and gubernatorial elec-
tions for decades in states such as New Jersey and Massachusetts.”); Grace & 
Klein, supra note 38, at 105 (“The cost and availability of property insurance 
has been a potent issue in many coastal areas, none more so than Florida.”). 
 225. See Cummins, supra note 148, at 13; Grace & Klein, supra note 38, at 
105. This is hardly surprising, as state insurance commissioners are either 
elected or appointed by the state governor, and thus operate in a highly politi-
cized environment. See Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, Regulator Per-
formance, Regulatory Environment and Outcomes: An Examination of Insur-
ance Regulator Career Incentives on State Insurance Markets, 32 J. BANKING & 
FIN. 116, 121 (2008). 
 226. See Stephen D’Arcy, Insurance Price Deregulation: The Illinois Exper-
ience, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 38, at 
248, 265–66; Scott E. Harrington, Effects of Prior Approval Rate Regulation of 
Auto Insurance, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE supra 
note 38, at 285, 309. 
 227. See Harrington, supra note 226, at 309–10. 
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set by artificially high prices or else insurers will simply refuse 
to write coverage in the state.228 This pattern not only results 
in artificially large price changes and volatility in the availabil-
ity of coverage, but it also promotes moral hazard and adverse 
selection.229  
Although some states’ price regulations are indeed exces-
sive, state market conduct regulation—defined here to include 
price and form regulation230—is actually dominated by prob-
lems of precisely the opposite character. In part, this is because 
the character of price regulation has changed across the coun-
try in the last decade. Only fifteen states currently require in-
surers’ pricing schemes to be approved before they are offered 
in the marketplace and no state unilaterally sets insurance 
rates.231 With a few notable exceptions (such as Florida), these 
states are increasingly abandoning efforts to use price regula-
tion as a tool to keep premiums below market rates.232 Rather, 
 
 228. This is particularly evident in Florida, where homeowners must in-
creasingly purchase their coverage from a state-run insurer because so many 
private insurers refuse to operate in that market. See Grace & Klein, supra 
note 38, at 90. Recently, State Farm threatened to leave the Florida market, 
and agreed to stay only after the state regulator allowed it to nonrenew up to 
fifteen percent of its residential property policies and to raise its insurance 
rates on approximately fifteen percent on all homeowners and condominium 
unit owners policies. See Lavonne Kuykendall, Insurer State Farm Drops Plan 
to Leave Florida, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT 
-CO-20091216-712292.html. 
 229. See Harrington, supra note 226, at 310; Sharon Tennyson, Efficiency 
Consequences of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets 18 (Networks Fin. 
Inst., Policy Brief No. 2007-PB-03, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985578 (suggesting attempts to regulate insur-
ance prices may be “self-defeating in the long run”). 
 230. Market conduct regulation is sometimes distinguished from the regu-
lation of insurance policy forms and rates. The former is envisioned to encom-
pass only issues such as insurers’ advertising, selling, and claims handling. 
This Article collapses this distinction for expositional ease. 
 231. See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., STATE AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE REGULATION: A NATIONAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND IN-DEPTH 
REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUELY EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SYSTEM 2–3 
(2008), http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/ 
state_auto_insurance_report.pdf (reporting that fifteen states use prior ap-
proval, twenty-three states employ file and use, eight states employ use and 
file, and four have limited regulatory oversight). In contrast, in January 2001, 
thirty-one states required prior approval of automobile insurance rates. Cum-
mins, supra note 148, at 3. 
 232. See, e.g., Phil Gusman, Mass. AG, Insurers Spar Over State’s Auto In-
surance System, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Dec. 28, 2009, http:// 
www.property-casualty.com/News/2009/12/Pages/Mass-AG-Insurers-Spar-Over 
-States-Auto-Insurance-System.aspx (describing Massachusetts’ abandonment 
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they are tending to focus their scrutiny on the more defensible 
goal of ensuring that rates do not discriminate among policy-
holders based on illegitimate criteria.233 
Even more importantly, insurance market conduct regula-
tion outside of price regulation is generally subject to political 
forces that lead to underregulation rather than overregulation. 
In contrast to price regulation, most forms of market conduct 
regulation only matter to consumers who actually use their in-
surance. Examples include regulations governing the qualifica-
tions and duties of insurance agents, the accuracy and effec-
tiveness of disclosures, the substance of insurance policies, and 
the willingness of insurers to settle claims promptly and fair-
ly.234 Because most policyholders never suffer substantial 
losses, they generally have no first-hand experience with these 
regulatory issues.235 And when consumers do experience losses, 
and potentially encounter market conduct regulatory issues, 
those experiences are normally discrete and non-correlated.236 
Not only are most forms of market conduct regulation unfami-
liar to consumers, they are also quite complex. Unlike with 
premiums, an appreciation of the contractual and regulatory 
rules governing insurers and their sales force is generally ne-
cessary to understand these issues.  
Because the vast majority of market conduct regulations 
are complex and nonsalient, they are more prone to regulatory 
capture and underregulation than the excesses that have char-
acterized price regulation in the recent past. The leading study 
of the political economy of insurance regulation concluded that 
 
of the system of setting insurance “rates that would be used by all auto insur-
ers”).  
 233. See infra text accompanying notes 244–57. 
 234. See generally ROBERT W. KLEIN, A REGULATOR’S INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 107–13, 140–67 (2d ed. 2005) (providing an over-
view of the elements of market conduct regulation). 
 235. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1414 (“Unlike virtually any other 
product, the most important element of insurance policies—the protection they 
provide against low-probability, high-cost losses—is also an element that only 
a few insureds actually use or experience.”). 
 236. This is not an accident. Insurance is specifically designed to aggregate 
an individual’s risks of loss so that the risks occur in predictable and steady 
fashion. See BAKER, supra note 138, at 2. The obvious exception involves mass 
catastrophes, where insurance regulatory issues can become quite politically 
salient precisely because numerous policyholders simultaneously experience a 
sizeable and publicly accessible loss. Insurance regulators may tend to be less 
captured by industry interests in such scenarios. Elizabeth Baker Murrill, 
Mass Disaster Mediation: Innovative ADR, or a Lion’s Den?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RE-
SOL. L.J. 401, 403–07 (2007). 
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industry interests historically dominated debates about regula-
tory issues at the state level when those issues were complex 
and not politically salient.237 Perhaps the most notorious exam-
ple is the institutionalization of semiprivate rate-making or-
ganizations that facilitated price fixing among competing prop-
erty/casualty insurers.238 When insurance issues are not 
politically salient, political forces are relatively weak but indus-
try interests can be quite strong, especially when the industry 
is relatively unified in its position. This is hardly surprising, as 
state insurance regulators interact constantly with industry 
representatives.239 Even more importantly, there is also a sig-
 
 237. Randall, supra note 1, at 679; see also MEIER, supra note 38 (“The po-
litical economy of insurance regulation results from a complex interaction of 
insurance groups, consumer interests, regulatory bureaucrats, and political 
elites.”).  
 238. Meier’s excellent book reviews a number of examples of this phenome-
non in depth. See generally MEIER, supra note 38. Consider two of the most 
important examples. First, the Armstrong Committee of 1906 was formed by 
the New York legislature in the wake of massive publicity concerning the 
extravagant lifestyles of insurance industry executives. Id. at 58–59. The 
Committee uncovered substantial abuses in the life insurance industry, lead-
ing to comprehensive reform of the life insurance business. By contrast, the 
Merritt Committee was formed around the same time in response to the San 
Francisco earthquake, which bankrupted several property/casualty insurance 
companies. Id. at 59–61. Unlike the Armstrong Committee, insurers were able 
to control the agenda of the Merritt Committee in order to develop a scheme of 
collaborative ratemaking that ultimately created a state-run system for fixing 
fire insurance premiums. See id. at 57–64. Meier concludes that proper-
ty/casualty insurers fared better than life insurers because “the Merritt Com-
mittee asked reasons why fire insurance companies failed and the Armstrong 
Committee addressed political and economic abuses by the life insurance in-
dustry. The former, dealing with adequate rates and other technical issues, is 
more complex than the latter. The insurance industry was able to improve its 
position with the Merritt Committee because it was able to control information 
in a complex area.” Id. at 84–85. Second, consider the fact that the proper-
ty/casualty industry operated largely under a state-sponsored cartel during 
the first half of the twentieth century. Insurance rates were set by industry 
rate bureaus, which were minimally regulated. Such regulation permitted spe-
cified levels of underwriting profits, and excluded any investment income in 
calculating these profits, even though investing the float on insurance pre-
miums is a substantial portion of the insurance business model. Id. at 64. It 
was only when antitrust charges were brought against the insurance industry, 
resulting in the Supreme Court case Southeastern Underwriters that this 
model changed. Prior to that politically salient event, “thirty five states filed 
briefs opposing the Justice Department’s” position that insurance was com-
merce that was subject to the authority of the federal government, suggesting 
that “the dominant partner in the symbiotic relationship between state regu-
lators and the insurance companies was the insurance companies.” Id. at 66.  
 239. See Randall, supra note 1, at 677–82 (discussing interactions between 
industry representatives and regulators at NAIC meetings). 
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nificant amount of cross-fertilization between the industry and 
top state regulators, with seventeen percent of state insurance 
commissioners employed in the insurance industry before be-
coming commissioners, and fifty percent of commissioners 
going directly to insurance industry positions after their tenure 
as commissioners.240  
This trend is evident in some of the most important market 
conduct issues of the last decade. First, industry interests have 
dominated debates about the public release of company-specific 
information. For years, consumer advocates have sought the re-
lease of data about individual insurers’ market conduct practic-
es, such as how often claims were paid within specified time 
periods, how often claims were denied, how often policyholders 
sued, and how often policies were canceled or nonrenewed.241 
Such information, while absolutely necessary to assess the rel-
ative quality of different insurance options, is almost entirely 
absent from the public domain.242 In 2008, under the leadership 
of a pro-consumer state insurance commissioner, the Market 
Conduct and Consumer Affairs Committee of the NAIC pro-
posed publicly disclosing this data. Organizing through the 
American Council of Life Insurers, the American Insurance As-
sociation, the National Association of Mutual Insurers, and the 
Property Casualty Insurers of North America, the industry suc-
cessfully defeated the proposal through a massive lobbying 
campaign.243 
Second, industry interests have generally prevailed with 
respect to the use of credit scoring in insurance, which consum-
er groups have consistently attacked over the last decade.244 
The vast majority of automobile and homeowners insurers use 
 
 240. Grace & Phillips, supra note 225, at 122 tbl.1.  
 241. See James Connolly, NAIC Insurer Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insur-
ers, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www 
.property-casualty.com/News/2008/9/Pages/NAIC-Insurer-Conduct-Data-Scheme 
-Riles-Insurers.aspx; Letter from Lawrence Mirel to Sandy Praeger, President 
of the Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm’rs (Apr. 16, 2008) (on file with author). Unfor-
tunately, insurers have bitterly resisted the proposal under the guise of confi-
dentiality and trade secrets. See infra text accompanying notes 307–09. 
 242. See Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 734. 
 243. See supra note 241. 
 244. See, e.g., CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & BIRNY BIRN-
BAUM, CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, CREDIT SCORING AND INSURANCE: COSTING 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS AND PERPETUATING THE ECONOMIC RACIAL DIVIDE 1, 
18 (2007), available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/reports/content/Insurance 
Scoring.pdf (calling for a ban on the use of credit scoring in insurance, but not-
ing that many states permit it).  
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policyholders’ credit scores to price their policies.245 This is not 
surprising, given that there is substantial evidence that indi-
viduals’ credit scores correspond to their losses.246 However, it 
is still unclear why this is the case—there is limited reason to 
expect that consumers’ likelihood of paying back loans would 
predict their likelihood of suffering an insurance loss.247 This is 
significant because insurers have long been prohibited from re-
lying on certain underwriting factors even though they may be 
predictive of losses, such as race and home value.248 Yet credit 
scores serve as strong proxies for these characteristics.249  
Third, the insurance industry has dominated state insur-
ance regulators’ responses to insurance intermediaries’ com-
pensation arrangements. In 2004, the New York Attorney Gen-
eral sued several prominent insurance brokers for accepting 
kickbacks from insurers to whom they steered business.250 Al-
though the lawsuit resulted in the leading insurance brokers 
abandoning this practice, state insurance regulators have done 
virtually nothing to address the larger issues that the lawsuits 
identified, particularly in consumer insurance markets.251 No 
state has passed any substantive regulations of agents’ com-
mission arrangements, and the disclosure regulations that do 
exist are extremely limited.252 New York’s recent efforts to de-
velop more extensive disclosure requirements prompted exten-
sive industry outcry, causing New York to limit the scope of the 
required disclosures.253 
 
 245. See id. at 4. 
 246. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS 
ON CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 3 (2007), available at http://www 
.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_Credit-Based_Insurance_Scores.pdf.  
 247. See id. (reporting that “there is not sufficient evidence to judge” why 
the correlation exists). 
 248. See id. at 61 (“The risk models that companies build do not include 
information about race, ethnicity, or income. If there are large differences in 
average risk based on [those factors], then models may attribute some of those 
differences in risk to other variables included in the model . . . .”). See general-
ly Austin, supra note 208, at 528 (discussing legislative restrictions on factors 
insurers may consider). 
 249. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 246, at 72–73 (finding a “proxy 
effect” between credit scores and race). 
 250. Schwarcz, supra note 169, at 290. 
 251. See id. at 291; see also Robert W. Cooper, Spitzer’s Allegations of the 
Anticompetitive Effects of Contingent Commissions: A Shot Truly Heard 
Around the World, J. INS. REG., Fall 2007, at 83, 100 (detailing American regu-
latory responses to industry problems with conflicts of interest). 
 252. See Schwarcz, supra note 169, at 292. 
 253. See Phil Gusman, IIABNY Threatens Suit Over N.Y. Producer Comp Rule, 
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In sum, the available evidence simply does not suggest that 
insurance market conduct regulation as a whole can accurately 
be characterized as excessive. To be sure, state insurance regu-
lation is occasionally quite aggressive, particularly when it 
comes to rate regulations. Moreover, strong consumer advo-
cates do occasionally come into power in particular states and 
implement more far-reaching consumer protection programs.254 
But in the aggregate, ordinary “monopolistic” insurance regula-
tion is more frequently subject to substantial regulatory cap-
ture that produces underregulation as opposed to excessive 
regulation. Trying to address this problem by embracing even a 
limited form of regulatory competition, such as that embodied 
in the OFC, would exacerbate this problem rather than solve it.  
B. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND IMPROVING REGULATORY 
EFFICIENCY 
A second key supply-side argument for regulatory competi-
tion is that it can promote more efficient regulation that reduc-
es compliance costs for insurers but does not sacrifice effective-
ness. In the insurance context, this argument is primarily 
directed at solvency regulation.255 Indeed, the two key elements 
of state solvency regulation—capital and reserve require-
ments256—have remained relatively static over the last two 
 
NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.property 
-casualty.com/News/2009/12/Pages/IIABNY-Threatens-Suit-Over-NY-Producer 
-Comp-Rule.aspx; Mark E. Ruquet, N.Y. Compensation Rules Would Burden 
Them, Some Agents Say, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Sept. 11, 
2009, http://www.property-casualty.com/News/2009/9/Pages/NY-Compensation 
-Rules-Would-Burden-Them-Some-Agents-Say.aspx. 
 254. Recent examples include J. Robert Hunter in Texas and John Gara-
mendi in California. See, e.g., Linda Tuma, Hunter Refocuses Texas Ins. Dept., 
NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Mar. 21, 1994; Joseph B. Treaster, States Increase Their 
Scrutiny of Insurance Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2004/10/21/business/21broker.htm (discussing Garamendi’s efforts as the 
California Insurance Commissioner). 
 255. Once again, the primary efficiency argument with respect to market 
conduct regulation is based on the need for multistate insurers to comply with 
multiple regulatory schemes and is not addressed for that reason. See supra 
note 221. 
 256. See generally KLEIN, supra note 234, at 140–64 (discussing capital 
standards and reserve requirements and their use in solvency regulation). Of 
course, solvency regulation encompasses various additional elements. For in-
stance, solvency regulations impose limits on the types of assets that insurers 
can hold. See id. at 146. Additionally, they include less quantitative review of 
insurer activity, such as scrutiny of insurers’ management. See id. at 161–62. 
All solvency rules are enforced via quarterly and annual reports that insurers 
must file with state regulators, as well as by regular examinations of insurers’ 
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decades, even though their shortcomings have become increa-
singly apparent during that time.257  
First, state regulators have done very little since the early 
1990s to modernize their approach to setting capital require-
ments for insurers. Currently, insurers’ capital requirements 
are primarily determined by a risk-based formula that at-
tempts to measure insurers’ underwriting risk, asset risk, in-
terest rate risk, and business risk.258 Various remedial meas-
ures are required when insurers fall below the requisite capital 
measures dictated by the risk-based formula.259 In the last two 
decades, though, the limits of this approach to setting capital 
requirements have become increasingly clear. First, it does not 
take into account substantial factors associated with insolven-
cies, including management risk and catastrophe risk.260 
 
records to ensure the accuracy of more regular reports. See id. at 149–50. In-
surers’ annual statements to regulators are completed according to statutory 
accounting principles (SAP). Id. at 150. These are designed to be more con-
servative than generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). See id. at 
150–51. In particular, both assets and liabilities are valued on a liquidation 
basis, rather than a going-concern basis. Id. For an example of how SAP calcu-
lations work, see SEAN MOONEY & LARRY COHEN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF AC-
COUNTING & TAXATION OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES 22–26 
(1991). 
 257. The current state solvency regime was largely constructed in the early 
1990s, when several highly visible insurance failures forced state regulators to 
modernize their approach to insurance regulation. See Grace, supra note 41, at 
10 (“[S]olvency regulation as practiced by the states and the NAIC has not 
been scrutinized since Congress made them do so in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.”). 
 258. There are actually three different models: one for life insurers, one for 
property/casualty, and one for health. See Martin Eling & Ines Holzmüller, An 
Overview and Comparison of Risk-Based Capital Standards, J. INS. REG., 
Summer 2008, at 31, 34. In order to be accredited by the NAIC, states are re-
quired to adopt the Risk-Based Capital for Insurers Model Act (RBC Model 
Act), MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES: RISK-BASED CAPITAL 
(RBC) FOR INSURERS MODEL ACT 312-1 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs. 2010), or 
substantially similar provisions. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS., FINANCIAL 
REGULATION STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION PROGRAM 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_f_FRSA_pamphlet.pdf. The Act sets 
insurers’ capital requirements by aggregating risk charges for an insurer’s as-
sets, liabilities, and other risks into a number that represents the level of capi-
tal required to support ongoing operations. See Pottier & Sommer, supra note 
131, at 104.  
 259. For instance, while insurers who fall below the first threshold must 
file a remedial plan with regulators, insurers who fall below the last threshold 
must be seized by insurance regulators. See Klein, supra note 258, at 31 
tbl.IV.1. 
 260. See Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 258, at 55–56. This is striking giv-
en the significance of these two factors in most insurer insolvencies and the 
fact that other countries do include these factors in risk-based capital models. 
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Second, it assigns crude ratings to different assets and liabili-
ties that only partially reflect the actual associated risks.261 
Third, it does a poor job accounting for insurers’ diversification 
and risk mitigation measures, employing a simple covariance 
formula that does not credit standard hedging techniques, 
much less sophisticated portfolio design.262  
Reserve requirements, the second core element of insur-
ance solvency regulation, have similarly evolved quite slowly 
over the last twenty years, especially with respect to life insur-
ance. Regulations require that insurers set aside dedicated re-
serves to pay for anticipated losses on their policies in the fu-
ture.263 In the life insurance industry, regulators strictly 
specify the criteria that insurers must use to predict those 
losses.264 Yet life insurance products have evolved dramatically 
in the last decade as life insurers have increasingly competed 
with banks and securities firms to develop capital accumulation 
products.265 Regulators’ formulaic rules for establishing re-
serves do not come close to keeping up with this rapid pace of 
product development.266 Regulations governing reserves can 
 
See Simon Ashby et al., Lessons About Risk: Analysing the Causal Chain of 
Insurance Company Failure, J. INS. RES. & PRAC., July 2003, at 1, 4–13. 
 261. See J. David Cummins et al., Insolvency Experience, Risk-Based Capi-
tal, and Prompt Corrective Action in Property-Liability Insurance, 19 J. BANK-
ING & FIN. 511 passim (1995) (finding that the predictive accuracy of the RBC 
formula for property-casualty companies is low, and proposing several modifi-
cations that could improve its accuracy); Scott Harrington, Capital Adequacy 
in Insurance and Reinsurance, in BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND 
INSURANCE, supra note 211, at 104–05 (noting that NAIC’s risk-based capital 
standards are crude measures of real risk). 
 262. See Herring & Schuermann, supra note 211, at 30 (noting that rules-
based systems for setting capital standards “do not take into account the di-
versification benefits achieved through less than perfect correlation (the so-
called portfolio effect)”); id. at 38 (describing ways in which the NAIC RBC ap-
proach does, and does not, take into account diversification). 
 263. See Larry Bruning, Principles-Based Reserving: A Regulator’s Perspec-
tive, J. INS. REG., Spring 2006, at 3, 3–4. 
 264. See id. at 4. 
 265. See Brown, supra note 23, at 8 (“Both consumers and regulators find it 
increasingly difficult to discern meaningful differences among insurance, 
banking and securities products.”); Peter J. Wallison, Convergence in Finan-
cial Services Markets: Effects on Insurance Regulation, in THE FUTURE OF IN-
SURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at 167, 179 (“In-
surers have developed tools and products that are increasingly substitutes for 
capital market instruments.”). 
 266. See Bruning, supra note 263, at 4 (noting regulators’ concern that “the 
current system does not adequately account for the new risks”); Wallison, su-
pra note 265, at 172–73 (discussing institutional resistance to regulatory 
change). 
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consequently be both over- and under-inclusive: they some-
times damage life insurers’ capacity to compete with other fi-
nancial services firms by requiring excessive reserves, and they 
sometimes create large insolvency risk by requiring inadequate 
reserves.267  
Embracing an OFC or other scheme of limited regulatory 
competition is one plausible approach to inducing more rapid 
modernization of solvency regulation. A key benefit of regulato-
ry competition is that it tends to improve regulators’ respon-
siveness to industry needs and incentives to embrace innova-
tion.268 An OFC, for instance, might well prompt state and 
federal regulators to more quickly develop appropriate solvency 
requirements for new products, as failing to do so could mean 
losing the business of insurers. Similarly, it might prompt com-
peting federal and state regulators to develop more sophisti-
cated tools for setting capital requirements that take into ac-
count the diversification of insurers’ portfolios and their 
exposure to catastrophe and operational risk.  
Enhanced regulatory competition nonetheless does not 
represent an attractive option for improving state solvency reg-
ulation. The key reason is that it is incompatible with the most 
promising substantive approach to improving solvency regula-
tion: shifting towards a more principles-based solvency para-
digm.269 Principles-based solvency regulation deemphasizes, 
 
 267. See Bruning, supra note 263, at 4 (contrasting regulators’ fears of ex-
cessive risk with insurers’ desire to compete with other financial services pro-
viders on the basis of their own risk management processes); Wallison, supra 
note 265, at 183 (describing the difficulty of striking the right balance of regu-
latory oversight and vigorous industry competition). 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 216–19. 
 269. Lawrence Cunningham takes issue with the notion that regulatory 
schemes can be, or ought to be, designated principles-based or rules-based. 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-
based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 1411 passim (2007). Cunningham’s basic argument is that regu-
latory systems usually use both rules and standards, meaning that it is not 
desirable to cabin regulatory schemes in one category or the other. See id. This 
Article does not necessarily take issue with this claim, arguing only that in-
surance regulation can be substantially improved by incorporating more stan-
dards than exist in the status quo, and then carefully working to hold insurers 
accountable for pursuing those standards. See, e.g., Kenneth Bamberger, Reg-
ulation as Delegation, 56 DUKE L. J. 377 (2006) (discussing costs and benefits 
of this form of regulation). Increased usage of standards does not mean, and 
should not mean, that rules-based approaches should not also be employed 
when they would prove effective. See Therese M. Vaughan, The Implications of 
Solvency II for U.S. Insurance Regulation, passim (Networks Fin. Inst., Pol’y 
Brief No. 2009-PB-03, 2009), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_ 
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but does not eliminate, reliance on prescribed formulas and re-
quirements designed to measure firms’ financial health, such 
as capital requirements and mandatory reserves.270 It supple-
ments such bright-line rules with more flexible and firm-
specific risk-management strategies, often attempting to enlist 
firms in developing these approaches. 
Increased usage of principles-based regulation has numer-
ous potential benefits: it harnesses the experience and sophisti-
cation of firms; it allows regulation to more easily keep up with 
innovation; it is sufficiently flexible to encourage, and account 
for, risk diversification; and it may promote internal forces 
within insurers to manage risk more effectively.271 In recogni-
tion of these benefits, state insurance regulation has gradually 
been moving towards a principles-based approach to solvency 
regulation over the last several years.272 Moreover, enhanced 
principle-based regulation is an important element of interna-
tional efforts to modernize solvency regulation, including Sol-
vency II (European Union) and the Insurance Core Principles 
 
docs/090305_vaughan_presentation.pdf (advocating for a principles-based ap-
proach that is backstopped by a more rules-based approach). 
 270. See Vaughan, supra note 269, at 11–12 (contrasting American regula-
tions with proposed European reforms). Unlike American regulators, insur-
ance regulators in the European Union are on the cusp of embracing this more 
fluid approach to determining capital requirements, in a project known as Sol-
vency II. See id. at 2.  
 271. See Herring & Schuermann, supra note 211, at 30, 33 (permitting the 
supervised use of internal models is “an implicit recognition of the complexity 
and the fast pace of innovation in financial instruments and institutions, 
where any rule written to set capital charges for a given set of instruments 
may spur innovations to reduce or avoid the charge. Only an internal models 
approach is likely to be able to address the portfolio of risks comprehensively 
and dynamically”); Vaughan, supra note 269, at 4–6. 
 272. First, the NAIC has just recently sought input from the NAIC mem-
bership on criteria for a statistical agent to collect firms’ principles-based re-
serve data, and has promulgated a corporate governance guide for firms utiliz-
ing principle-based reserves. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, PRINCIPLES-
BASED RESERVING WORKING GROUP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDANCE 
FOR PRINCIPLES-BASED RESERVES (2009), available at http://www.naic.org/ 
documents/committees_ex_isftf_pbr_wg_corporate_governance_guide_pbr.pdf; 
Principles-Based Reserving (EX) Working Group, http://www.naic.org/ 
committees_ex_isftf_pbr_wg.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). Among its goals 
for 2010, the NAIC intends to evaluate necessary changes to state laws to ef-
fectuate a principles-based regulatory framework. See Principle-Based Reserv-
ing (EX) Working Group, supra. Second, state insurance regulators have slow-
ly introduced a principles-based approach into their risk-based capital 
requirements. For instance, the NAIC has implemented limited programs to 
rely on internal models for assessing interest rate risk on fixed annuities in 
2000, and variable annuities in 2005. Vaughan, supra note 269, at 7. 
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(International Association of Insurance Supervisors).273 A simi-
lar movement towards principles-based regulation is a funda-
mental component of international reform in banking regula-
tion, although the desirability of such reform is substantially 
more controversial in that context than in insurance given the 
major systemic risks associated with banking.274 
The key role of regulators in a principles-based solvency 
scheme is to hold insurers accountable for effectively imple-
menting regulatory principles.275 In order to realize the benefits 
of principles-based regulation, regulators must effectively “re-
gulate the exercise of [insurers’] judgment.”276 There is no 
 
 273. See Brown, supra note 3, at 963–72 (discussing in detail the Insurance 
Core Principles and Solvency II). 
 274. See id. at 964–65. Basel II has been subject to extensive criticism, es-
pecially in the wake of the financial crisis. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Re-
turn of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 133–41 (2009) (discussing criticisms 
against Basel II’s operational risk provisions); Marketplace: Banks Brace for 
Basel II (American Public Media radio broadcast July 2, 2008), available at 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/07/02/basel_ii/. But the case 
for principles-based solvency regulation in insurance is much stronger than 
the case for using such an approach in banking, as banking implicates various 
systemic risks that are largely absent in the insurance arena. See supra text 
accompanying notes 85–86, 132. Moreover, it is possible that insurance regu-
lators would have an easier time assessing the adequacy of internal models 
than banking regulators as many of the most important elements, such as un-
derwriting risk, are within the core competencies of insurance regulators. See 
KLEIN, supra note 234, at 119 (describing risk governance as one of the basic 
responsibilities of insurance regulators). 
 275. A second, related, drawback of a principles-oriented regulatory 
scheme is that it creates an increased risk of regulatory forbearance. As firms 
find themselves in financial trouble, regulators may have strong incentives to 
defer aggressive intervention in the hopes that the firm’s prospects will turn 
around. Such forbearance can substantially exacerbate the ultimate costs of 
financial failure. See Martin F. Grace et al., Insurance Company Failures: Why 
Do They Cost So Much? 23 (Ctr. for Risk Mgmt. & Ins. Research, Ga. State 
Univ., Working Paper No. 03-1, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=463103 (finding evidence of regulatory forbearance in 
insurance); Therese M. Vaughan, The Implications of Prompt Corrective Action 
for Insurance Firms 4–6 (Networks Fin. Inst., Pol’y Brief No. 2008-PB-02, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099426 
(discussing reasons for and consequences of regulatory forbearance).  
 276. Bamberger, supra note 269, at 381; Saule Omarova, Rethinking the 
Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, BROOK. J. INT’L L. (forth-
coming). By contrast, the rules-based regulations of capital and reserve re-
quirements are largely formulaic, mitigating the need for regulators to rely on 
the judgment of individual insurers and thus the risk that they will be misled 
by the wrong-headed or disingenuous exercise of that judgment. See Bruning, 
supra note 263, at 4 (noting that a rules-based approach to setting reserves 
has the benefit of “clarity and specificity,” meaning that “regulators have a 
good understanding of just how . . . reserves [are] calculated” by insurers); El-
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doubt that this is a difficult task, as firms have substantially 
more expertise, knowledge, and resources than regulators, po-
tentially allowing them to successfully defend patently insuffi-
cient risk-management safeguards.277 However, a burgeoning 
field of academic literature explores various mechanisms 
through which regulators can improve the accountability of 
firms to meaningfully exercise their judgment as to the best 
way to accomplish regulatory ends.278 A particularly important 
way in which regulators can accomplish this is by cultivating 
their capacity to participate in the development of firms’ inter-
nal efforts at regulatory compliance.279 Although firms will 
clearly have substantially greater expertise regarding their 
own risks, regulators can bring to the table a different type of 
expertise developed from interacting with multiple firms over 
time.280 They also can bring a different orientation that is not 
embedded within the firm’s assumptions and culture.281  
 
ing & Holzmüller, supra note 258, at 54 (“The U.S. system [of RBC] has rela-
tively strict rules with clear sanctions . . . .”); id. at 53 (noting that a solvency 
scheme that permits insurers to use internal models to set capital levels 
means that regulators need more resources to review different sophisticated 
models); Vaughan, supra note 269, at 16 (regulators must “understand how 
. . . risks are modeled and . . . make judgments as to whether they are modeled 
adequately” to effectively implement principles-based regulation). 
 277. See Vaughan, supra note 269, at 16 n.22 (“[R]egulatory capture 
is . . . much more subtle and sophisticated than in the past. It’s not about bri-
bery and corruption of officials. . . . It’s about big business persuading regula-
tors about certain principles that seem eminently reasonable, although on fur-
ther examination I believe are hollow and bankrupt; principles that the 
regulators grab hold of and believe are right, but actually ultimately support 
big businesses and the regulated.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 278. For a very good review of these mechanisms, see Bamberger, supra 
note 269, at 436–68. See generally Saule Omarova, Wall Street as “Community 
of Fate:” Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author) (arguing that industry self-regulation, properly incenti-
vized, can effectively minimize systemic risk in the market). 
 279. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 297–388 (1998) (describ-
ing the team-oriented makeup of the modern American firm and the ways in 
which government can effectively interact with it); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
“New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Anti-
dote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473–75 (2004) (discussing 
a “new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-
solving New Governance”). 
 280. See Bamberger, supra note 269, at 464. 
 281. See id. at 444–45 (discussing the ability of external interactions to 
promote sound internal decision making in the firm). 
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Regulatory competition undermines the capacity of regula-
tors to hold firms accountable in these ways.282 First, regulatory 
competition cripples regulators’ ability “to leverage enforcement 
threats as a means to bargain for cooperative engagement” in 
the development of firm-specific risk-management strategies.283 
Simply put, regulators operating in a scheme of regulatory 
competition would always need to worry that enforcement 
threats would trigger a regulatory switch. This would diminish 
their ability to insist that they be treated as real partners in 
the development of risk-mitigation measures. Second, regulato-
ry competition would undermine the role of regulators as long-
term partners of insurers by rendering that relationship tem-
porally unstable. Because firms could, at any time, choose to 
switch regulators, regulators would have less reason to invest 
in developing firm-specific knowledge and cultivating relation-
ships with “double agents” within insurers who could be 
counted upon to safeguard regulatory objectives. Firms would 
be less likely to fully treat individual regulators as partners in 
this process for similar reasons: doing so in any meaningful 
way would be costly and time-consuming, and if the regulator 
insisted on such treatment the insurer would always have the 
option to switch regulators. 
For these reasons, if regulatory competition did promote 
principles-based regulation, it would promote a version of it 
that would inevitably resemble deregulation, as its critics often 
assert. This prospect is particularly unattractive as, notwith-
standing its obsolescence, the present system of solvency regu-
lation appears to have been effective in the recent financial cri-
sis. Virtually every major insurer has maintained its financial 
health in the last several years.284 Although AIG imploded, re-
 
 282. Regulatory competition might also increase the already-heightened 
risk of regulatory forbearance, see supra note 275, if it increased regulators’ 
willingness to permit risky bet-the-company strategies. This seems likely, as 
taking an aggressive approach to shutting down insurers on the brink of insol-
vency would decrease insurer demand for those regulators. It is perhaps for 
this reason that banking regulation seeks to limit the risk of regulatory for-
bearance by eliminating regulatory competition with respect to the decision of 
whether to shut down a bank, relying almost exclusively on a single agency—
the FDIC—to close a bank in financial distress. Despite such efforts, regulato-
ry forbearance with respect to small banks seems to have played an important 
role in the recent financial crisis. See Eric Dash, Pathology of a Crisis: At 
Failed Banks, Fatal Levels of Untreated Risk-Taking, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2009, at B1. 
 283. Bamberger, supra note 269, at 465. 
 284. See Grace, supra note 41, at 1–2.  
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quiring a massive federal bailout, it was actually AIG’s credit 
default swap activities, rather than its insurance operations, 
that drove AIG to the brink of collapse.285 To be sure, part of 
the industry’s success is attributable to market discipline, 
which encouraged insurers to maintain conservative portfolios 
in order to safeguard their ratings.286 But solvency regulation’s 
role in this success also cannot be easily dismissed, given that 
market discipline seems to have been insufficient to deter firms 
like AIG from adopting high-risk approaches and that execu-
tive compensation arrangements in the insurance industry are 
quite similar to the arrangements that seem to have induced 
excessive risk taking in other segments of the economy. Risk 
aversion, which is a guiding principle of most forms of solvency 
regulation, suggests that policymakers should be hesitant to 
radically alter a system that is achieving its basic goals, even if 
it may be doing so inefficiently.  
 
The insurance sector has, so far, escaped serious problems resulting 
from the financial crisis. Life insurers’ bond and equity portfolios are 
now valued lower and there have been rating downgrades in the life 
business. . . . Property-casualty (p-c) insurers as a group are also rela-
tively immune from the crisis as most p-c contracts are short term in 
nature and are less likely to become insolvent due to changes in their 
investment portfolio’s value. . . . One can argue that the current state 
based system did an excellent job of protecting insurers’ consumers 
and, to some extent, their stockholders, especially when superficially 
compared to the federal banking regulators. 
Id. 
 285. Insurance regulators had no jurisdiction over these activities, as fed-
eral regulators pressured state insurance regulators to issue an opinion letter 
in 2000 declaring that CDSs did not meet the definition of insurance. Hearing 
to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 81 (2009) (statement of Eric Dinal-
lo, Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department). In fact, AIG’s 
primary strategy in seeking to pay back its bailout funds has been to sell off 
its financially healthy insurance companies. Edmund L. Andrews, A.I.G. Says 
Revamping Could Take 3 to 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at B4; see also 
Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Credit Rating Woes Sent AIG Spiraling, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at C1. A recent article raises the prospect that AIG’s 
insurance operations are also on shaky financial ground. See Mary Williams 
Walsh, After Rescue, New Weakness Seen at A.I.G, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, 
at A1. The NAIC has asserted that the article contained “incomplete and mis-
leading information” and that “the 71 state-regulated insurance entities with-
in AIG are financially sound and are fully able to pay claims.” Press Release, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs., AIG: NAIC Focused on Fidelity to the Facts (July 
31, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.naic 
.org/Releases/2009_docs/aig_naic_focus_on_fidelity.htm. 
 286. See Harrington, supra note 261, at 104 (arguing that substantial mar-
ket discipline exists, given that life insurers curtailed asset risks in the 1990’s 
when problems arose, most insurers have very high RBC rations, and guaran-
tees are limited in many states and in all states are not more than $300,000). 
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C. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND SPECIALIZATION 
Another potential supply-side defense of regulatory compe-
tition is that it allows different regulators to specialize in dif-
ferent types of regulated entities. Regulators may develop par-
ticular expertise when dealing with similar types of regulated 
entities. Alternatively, regulatory competition may cause com-
peting jurisdictions to invest their limited resources and energy 
into developing substantive rules that are particularly relevant 
to a subset of regulated entities.287 One particularly good ex-
ample of regulatory specialization comes from the current in-
surance sphere, where Vermont has developed a sophisticated 
and elaborate body of law to govern captive insurers.288 Be-
cause captive insurers (by definition) only provide coverage to 
one entity, they can easily arrange to “sell” their coverage in 
Vermont.289  
This regulatory supply argument in favor of limited regula-
tory competition is plausible. For instance, it is possible that 
federal regulators in an OFC scheme might specialize in work-
ing with large national insurers because they have particular-
ized expertise relevant to the typical investment portfolios of 
large insurers. Similarly, state regulators might specialize in 
working on the particularized issues that face small insurers, 
such as their potentially limited access to capital markets or 
 
 287. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 288. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-536, RISK 
RETENTION GROUPS: COMMON REGULATORY STANDARDS AND GREATER MEM-
BER PROTECTIONS ARE NEEDED 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d05536.pdf. Captive insurers are subject to regulation only in their 
state of domicile and are more loosely regulated than traditional insurers. Id. 
Vermont dominates the market for captive insurers because its regulation of 
captive insurers is liberal and well developed. See id. at 4–6; Kelly Cruz-
Brown et al., Recent Developments in Insurance Regulation, 44 TORT TRIAL & 
INS. PRAC. L.J. 591, 620 (2009); Gordon A. Schaller & Scott A. Harshman, Use 
of Captive Insurance Companies in Estate Planning, 33 ACTEC J. 252, 252–54 
(2008) (providing background information on captive insurance companies, 
and noting that the captive insurance market is worldwide and that most U.S. 
corporations choose a domicile for the corporation with modern captive insur-
ance statutes, including Vermont).  
 289. As firms can purchase insurance coverage in a state for property or 
events in other states, firms can purchase insurance through captives in any 
jurisdiction. See INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, ISSUES PAPER ON THE REG-
ULATION AND SUPERVISION OF CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES 6–7 (2006), 
available at http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Issues_paper_on_regulation_and_ 
supervision_of_captive_insurance_companies.pdf (recounting the propagation 
of captive insurance companies in legally attractive jurisdictions separate from 
the headquarters of the insured firm). 
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the difficulties they may face in developing exclusive distribu-
tion schemes.  
At least relative to the status quo, however, this benefit of 
regulatory competition is minimal. First, the status quo system 
of insurance regulation already does a good job of marshalling 
regulatory resources from across the different states to meet 
the particularized needs of different insurers. For instance, 
through the NAIC and National Conference of Insurance Legis-
latures (NCOIL), state regulators and legislatures, respective-
ly, organize their collective experience and expertise to develop 
specialized model laws and best practices.290 Individual states 
are then free to incorporate the results of this resource-
intensive process into their own laws and regulations. In many 
ways, this cooperative system for developing substantive law 
works better than a scheme of regulatory competition in en-
hancing specialization, because it allows regulatory experts 
within different jurisdictions to collaborate in crafting appro-
priately narrowly tailored laws.291 Similarly, regulators from 
different states are often able to develop expertise by relying on 
a national web of resources, training materials, and guid-
ance.292 This allows even small state departments to have indi-
vidual staff members develop the specific expertise that they 
need to handle the regulatory issues they face on a daily basis. 
Second, at least in the property/casualty context, the most 
important specialized expertise that regulators can possess 
concerns the particularized risks that insurers face when oper-
ating in a specific state. That is because the business of proper-
ty/casualty insurance is in many ways inherently local. Differ-
ent geographic regions present different types of property 
hazards and different states have vastly different tort systems. 
The state-based system of insurance regulation naturally pro-
motes this form of regulatory specialization.  
IV.  REGULATING REGULATORY MARKETS IN 
INSURANCE   
Part II suggests that regulatory competition in insurance 
will create demand-side forces that promote inevitable deregu-
lation. Part III argues that such deregulation, even in the po-
 
 290. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 1, at 629–39; infra Part IV (discussing 
the efforts of the NAIC to coordinate regulation among different states). 
 291. Cf. Esty & Geradin, supra note 17, at 40–46 (discussing the benefits of 
cooperation among regulators). 
 292. See Vaughan, supra note 269, at 9–10. 
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tentially mild form associated with OFC proposals, is neither 
normatively desirable nor likely to enhance regulatory efficien-
cy. Like all markets, though, regulatory markets can them-
selves be regulated in order to harness the benefits, but limit 
the costs, of competition. In some cases, this regulation can op-
erate on regulatory supply, limiting the ability of competing 
regulators to deregulate beyond a certain point. For instance, 
bank regulation removes particularly sensitive regulatory is-
sues—such as reserve requirements—from the domain of com-
petition altogether. In other cases, regulation of regulatory 
markets can operate on regulatory demand, inducing firms to 
choose effective regulators. This, for instance, is one justifica-
tion for requiring firms to fund the costs of a guarantee fund. If 
firms must pay for the costs of failed firms, then they will have 
reason to demand effective regulators that prevent firms from 
failing and that intervene quickly, before the costs of those fail-
ures can be compounded.  
This Part considers these and other potential avenues for 
“regulating” regulatory competition in insurance. Section A be-
gins by focusing on two potential safeguards against the pros-
pect that regulatory competition would promote excessive deregu-
lation of insurers’ market conduct. First, it considers proposals 
that would set minimum standards for all competing regula-
tors, effectively limiting the domain over which competition 
may legitimately occur. While acknowledging the possibility 
that such safeguards might limit the risk of unbridled deregu-
lation, it questions how reliably these minimum standards 
would be enforced. Second, it examines a proposal that would 
allow individual jurisdictions to opt-out of regulatory competi-
tion through legislative action. Finding that such an opt-out 
would be largely illusory, section A argues that it would do lit-
tle to constrain regulatory competition.  
Section B turns to solvency regulation. In this domain, ef-
forts to improve the results of regulatory competition generally 
operate on the demand side of regulatory markets, seeking to 
improve insurers’ incentives to select socially desirable regula-
tors. Section B argues that such efforts are not likely to prove 
effective. It shows that sustainable guarantee funds that would 
counterbalance the risk of excessive solvency deregulation are 
difficult to construct. It also explores a central problem with 
proposals to require insurers to issue risk-linked securities as a 
means of supplementing guarantee funds.  
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A. MARKET CONDUCT SAFEGUARDS 
1. Mandatory Minimum Standards 
One potential approach to preventing regulatory competi-
tion from producing excessively lax laws is to create minimum 
standards for all regulated firms, irrespective of their chosen 
regulator. This strategy attempts to directly prevent regulatory 
competition from devolving beyond a certain point. Congress is 
currently considering this type of reform in the form of a new 
Consumer Financial Products Agency (CFPA). The agency 
would be empowered to set minimum standards for various 
consumer financial products (excluding insurance), irrespective 
of the companies involved in marketing and selling those prod-
ucts.293 It would thus set a regulatory floor that was relatively 
immune to the deregulatory forces of regulatory competition in 
the banking sphere.294  
The key drawback of relying on minimum standards to 
constrain regulatory competition is that those standards may 
not be enforced.295 Because minimum standards are specifically 
designed to constrain competing regulators’ discretion, they are 
unlikely to prove effective in influencing those regulators’ ac-
tions unless they are backed up by some enforcement mechan-
ism. In some contexts, this role is served by the prospect of 
preemption: competing jurisdictions that fail to adhere to fed-
erally imposed regulatory safeguards run the risk of having 
their power stripped from them by Congress.296  
Although federally imposed minimum standards overlaid 
on top of a scheme of regulatory competition would certainly 
decrease the risk of deregulation, it is unclear how effectively 
such minimum standards would be enforced in the insurance 
 
 293. See generally Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 
1880, 111th Cong. (2009).  
 294. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 91, at 98–101. 
 295. Another potential problem with minimum market conduct standards 
is that they may interfere with effective solvency regulation by individual 
competing regulators. The design of life insurance products influences the 
substance of appropriate solvency restrictions. See Regulatory Restructuring: 
Enhancing Consumer Protection: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Financial Ser-
vices, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (Statement of Gary E. Hughes, Executive Vice 
President & General Counsel, American Council of Life Insurers). A seemingly 
benign market conduct standard might consequently interfere with effective 
solvency regulation. 
 296. See Roe, supra note 33, at 624 (arguing that the threat of federal 
preemption exerts a disciplining effect on competition among states with re-
spect to corporate law); McDonnell, supra note 111, at 48. 
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context. This is because many, if not most, consumer protec-
tions in insurance take the form of broad standards that leave 
substantial discretion to those charged with their enforce-
ment.297 Examples abound.298 Regulators must assess whether 
the insurer refused to pay claims without conducting a reason-
able investigation; attempted to make unreasonably low set-
tlement offers; failed to approve or deny a claim within a rea-
sonable time period after a proof of loss has been submitted; or 
failed to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of 
claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably 
clear.299 They must determine whether premiums are “unfairly 
discriminatory” and whether policy forms are “unreasonably 
surprising or unfair.”300 And they must assess whether adver-
tising or sales tactics are misleading or unsuitable.301 
There are numerous reasons for the prominence of stan-
dards in insurance consumer protections. First, proper-
ty/casualty insurance contracts are themselves riddled with 
ambiguities and uncertainties.302 Not only does this leave a 
substantial amount of discretion and indeterminacy to insurers 
in applying the language, but it also leaves a substantial 
amount of discretion to regulators in regulating that relation-
ship.303 Second, insurance contracts are unique among financial 
contracts in that their value is explicitly contingent on individ-
ual and specific circumstances of the purchaser.304 This makes 
 
 297. In other words, they tend to be standards more than rules. See gener-
ally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557, 611 (1992). 
 298. To be sure, there are some counterexamples. For instance, some states 
prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements, which is a pretty clear rule. See 
Schwarcz, supra note 129, at 762–63. Similarly, there are some clear disclo-
sure requirements. See Schwarcz, supra note 169, at 313. 
 299. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES, VOL. VI, 900-1 UN-
FAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT (2008). 
 300. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 12401 (West 2009); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/143 (2009) (prohibiting unfair policy forms); MINN. STAT. § 70A.04 (2009) 
(prohibiting “excessive” premiums). 
 301. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES, VOL. V, 
§ 710-1 MASS MARKETING OF PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE MODEL 
REGULATION (2008). 
 302. See ABRAHAM, supra note 208, at 174 (“[I]nsurance policies often are 
not specific enough to make the rights and obligations of the parties during 
the claims process crystal clear.”). See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Con-
sumers Versus Managed Care: The New Class Actions, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 8 
(2001) (noting that health insurance policy language is broad and malleable). 
 303. Cf. KATHLEEN HEALD ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULA-
TION 103 (1995). 
 304. Jackson, supra note 184, at 330.  
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setting formulaic rules more difficult. Third, insurance regula-
tion relies much less heavily than other forms of regulation on 
disclosure for a variety of reasons.305 Although standardized 
disclosures are relatively easy to set formulaically, other types 
of regulations—such as those prohibiting false statements, un-
suitable sales, misleading advertising, discriminatory pricing, 
and the like—are much harder to set precisely ex ante.  
Even if competing regulators refuse to strictly enforce min-
imum standards, it is possible that other entities would do 
so.306 But no other enforcement mechanism could reasonably 
substitute for the enforcement efforts of insurance regulators. 
First, enforcing most nonsolvency related insurance standards 
requires expertise and knowledge. For instance, identifying un-
fair claims practices requires reviewing a tremendous amount 
of data.307 Similarly, determining whether a policy form con-
tains an unfair or surprising term requires experience review-
ing similar such forms. Second, market conduct violations are 
frequently—though certainly not always—case-specific, involv-
 
Contingent liabilities differ from fixed-return deposits or interests in 
investment pools in that the value of contingent liabilities cannot be 
determined without reference to unrelated events. In other words, the 
value of contingent liabilities does not depend on the performance of 
the issuing intermediary’s assets or the terms of the investment con-
tract itself. Fire and life insurance policies are classic examples of 
contingent liabilities. 
Id. 
 305. See id.  
 306. See The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Implications 
for Consumers and the FTC: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (Testimony of Prentiss Cox, Associate Profes-
sor, University of Minnesota Law School).  
Enforcement of consumer protection laws and rule-making for con-
sumer protection are different activities that require different models 
to be effective. Unified rule-making authority in an agency dedicated 
to consumer protection goals presents an extraordinary opportunity to 
reform the consumer finance system to ensure products and sales 
practices that meet minimum standards of fairness for consumers. 
Public enforcement, on the other hand, is best accomplished in an 
open model; a system that allows multiple public entities the oppor-
tunity to gauge compliance. 
Id. 
 307. See Letter from Birny Birnbaum, Executive Dir., Ctr. For Econ. Jus-
tice, to Timothy B. Mullen (July 1, 2008), available at http://www.naic.org/ 
documents/committees_d_saswg_CEJ_080701_comments.pdf (“[T]he founda-
tion for market analysis is data. Without meaningful data to analyze, market 
analysis is, at best, a limited exercise. . . .”). This data includes extensive self-
reporting from insurers themselves, complaint data from consumers, and self-
generated data from market conduct exams. See generally NAIC, MARKET 
REGULATION HANDBOOK (2009). 
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ing an individual instance where a claim was adjusted unrea-
sonably, a policy was impermissibly cancelled or nonrenewed, 
or an investigation was unreasonably delayed.308 Public entities 
other than insurance regulators, such as attorneys general, of-
ten have little incentive to involve themselves in such cases.309  
Finally, the judicial system would also be ill-equipped to 
enforce minimum standards when competing regulators failed 
to do so. Policyholders face various intractable obstacles to 
bringing suit after they are denied coverage. Claimants have an 
immediate need for cash and are generally risk averse, insurers 
can (and do) ignore complaints until they mature into credible 
litigation threats, and insurers enjoy significant strategic ad-
vantages from their repeat-player status.310 Moreover, the cur-
rent alternative dispute resolution options are quite limited in 
their effectiveness.311 Resort to judicial regulation is also very 
difficult for regulatory issues that might arise outside of the 
context of a claim denial, as these issues typically involve small 
dollar amounts. Although class actions are sometimes availa-
ble, often regulatory infractions are too case-specific to allow for 
aggregated litigation.312  
2. Legislative Opt-Out 
Another potential approach to regulating a regulatory 
market is to permit individual jurisdictions to opt out of the 
scheme if they determine that it is producing excessively lax 
regulation. Proponents of the SLS approach have suggested 
that permitting such an opt-out would safeguard against the 
risk that regulatory competition would produce excessive deregu-
 
 308. Unlike other financial products, insurance payments are contingent 
on idiosyncratic facts that are external to the contract itself. See Jackson, su-
pra note 184, at 330. 
 309. This pattern does not hold when illegal practices are widespread, as in 
the contingent-commission controversy. See Schwarcz, supra note 169, at 290. 
 310. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (providing the seminal 
analysis of why repeat players tend to have an advantage in judicial proceed-
ings); see also Schwarcz, supra note 129, at 741–50 (applying this analysis in 
the insurance context). 
 311. See Schwarcz, supra note 129, at 788–99. 
 312. Most insurance-related class actions concern nonclaims issues, such as 
the calculation of premiums or the selling of policies. See Eric Helland & Jona-
than Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from 
Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L. 2 tbl.3 (2007) (collecting instances of in-
surance class actions in recent years). There are exceptions, like the non-
original equipment manufacturer parts class action. See id. 
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lation.313 Under their proposal, a jurisdiction’s legislature 
would need to opt out, the opt-out would only apply prospec-
tively, and insurers would be permitted to exit any jurisdiction 
that selected this option.314 Although fashioned as a specific 
component of the SLS proposal, an opt-out could be extended to 
an OFC scheme simply by permitting individual states to re-
quire that federally chartered insurers comply with all state in-
surance regulations. 
Permitting jurisdictions to opt out of a scheme of regulato-
ry competition would be unlikely to substantially reduce the 
risk of excessive deregulation. The basic problem with this ap-
proach is that jurisdictions would be extremely unlikely to opt-
out of a scheme of regulatory competition, as doing so would 
disproportionately increase premiums in that jurisdiction. Opt-
ing-out would saddle a jurisdiction’s constituents not just with 
the costs of enhanced regulation, but also with the costs of re-
quiring all insurers to comply with a particular set of rules for 
doing business in that state. Given the salience of insurance 
prices,315 state legislatures would be unlikely to invoke this op-
tion even if they were displeased with the state of insurance 
regulation.  
Importantly, there is a key difference between the non-
uniformity that characterizes the status quo and the non-
uniformity that a state exercising a regulatory competition opt-
out would create. In the status quo, regulators have gradually 
developed (and continue to develop) numerous mechanisms for 
reducing the costs to multistate insurers of complying with 
multiple regulatory regimes.316 These mechanisms are designed 
 
 313. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40. 
 314. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 10; Butler & Ribstein, su-
pra note 4, at 40; see generally Epstein, supra note 36.  
 315. See supra text accompanying notes 158–60. 
 316. State regulators have pursued an aggressive agenda in the last decade 
to limit the structural problems created by a state regulatory system. For in-
stance, they have formed an Interstate Insurance Compact through which life 
insurers can seek product approval relatively quickly. See Interstate Ins. Prod. 
Reg. Comm’n, http://www.insurancecompact.org/index.htm (last visited Mar. 
19, 2010). They have automated the document submission process to regula-
tors by developing a single electronic filing system used by all of the states. 
See NAIC, System for Electronic Rate and Form Filing, http://www.serff.com/ 
index.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2010). They have coordinated the analysis of 
market conduct data as well as certain targeted multistate investigations. See 
generally Robert W. Klein & James Schacht, An Assessment of Insurance Mar-
ket Conduct Surveillance, 20 J. INS. REG. 51 (2001). Currently, they are devel-
oping a process for accrediting different states’ market conduct regulations, 
which should further decrease the costs to insurers of complying with multiple 
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and operated by the state regulatory system as a whole, 
through the NAIC.317 By contrast, any individual jurisdiction 
that exercised a regulatory competition opt-out would not have 
in place the infrastructure or developed procedures for reducing 
the costs to multistate insurers of complying with a separate 
regulatory regime for that state.  
An additional and more straightforward problem with rely-
ing on a legislative opt-out to discipline regulatory competition 
is that passing legislation is costly and difficult. Just as it is no 
defense of the status quo system of insurance regulation that 
state legislatures allow it to persist, so too would it be no de-
fense of regulatory competition that state legislatures chose not 
to opt out. Although the possibility of an opt-out might generate 
some pressure for competing regulators to avoid large or salient 
regulatory failures, regulatory competition might well produce 
deregulatory costs that do not reach these thresholds. 
B. SOLVENCY REGULATION, GUARANTEE FUNDS, AND MARKET-
BASED SAFEGUARDS 
Guarantee funds are state-provided assurances that poli-
cyholders who are entitled to insurance proceeds will receive 
payment up to a prespecified amount, even if their insurer is 
financially unable to pay.318 In the status quo, every insurance 
jurisdiction maintains a guarantee fund, which covers policy-
holders in that jurisdiction and which is funded by all insurers 
licensed to do business in that jurisdiction.319 With one excep-
tion, these funds are funded on a postassessment basis, mean-
ing that insurers only pay into the fund when, and if, a fellow 
insurer is unable to fully pay policyholders.320 This funding 
scheme may create some risk that a state will be unable to 
raise sufficient revenue from insurers to fully pay large guar-
antee fund obligations.321 New York, by contrast, relies on ex 
ante funding of its guarantee fund, meaning that it accumu-
 
regulatory regimes. See NAIC, Market Reg. and Consumer Aff. (D) Comm., 
http://www.naic.org/committees_d.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). These are 
only a small sampling of some of the most important efforts of the NAIC in the 
last decade to coordinate the regulatory process. As noted earlier, the effec-
tiveness of these programs can nonetheless legitimately be challenged. See su-
pra note 41. 
 317. See Randall, supra note 1, at 634–40. 
 318. See generally BAKER, supra note 138, at 683–93.  
 319. See KLEIN, supra note 234, at 164–66. 
 320. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 90. 
 321. See id. 
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lates a pool of money from insurers before any guarantee fund 
payments must be made.322 The central risk of such ex ante 
funding is that it allows budget-strapped legislatures to siphon 
off this money for general spending, as recently occurred in 
New York.323 
If properly incorporated into a scheme of regulatory compe-
tition, guarantee funds may improve the prospect that such 
competition will produce reliable solvency regulation. First, a 
guarantee fund can improve regulatory supply by acting as a 
type of product warranty.324 If competing jurisdictions are re-
quired to guarantee policyholder payment when an insurer that 
they regulate becomes insolvent, then those jurisdictions may 
supply effective solvency regulation so as to avoid making pay-
ments from the guarantee fund.325 Of course, this incentive is 
hardly perfect, as the political actors who set regulatory policy 
will not fully internalize that expected cost of paying a guaran-
tee. But these actors will at least face some political pressures 
from within their jurisdictions to limit this contingent risk.326  
Second, guarantee funds may also improve regulatory de-
mand if the insurers who select a competing regulator are re-
quired to contribute to the cost of that regulator’s guarantee 
payments. In that event, insurers may demand a strong solven-
cy regulator so as to reduce expected payouts to fund guarantee 
payments stemming from other insurers’ insolvencies. This 
would be especially likely if the fund were funded through ex 
post assessments, as the size of that assessment would directly 
correlate to the actual losses produced by an insurer’s insolven-
cy.327 However, an ex ante funding approach can also improve 
insurer demand so long as the premiums that insurers pay into 
the fund reflect a fair assessment of the expected cost of future 
insolvencies. Historically, though, states have done a poor job 
 
 322. See id. 
 323. See id. 
 324. See Bert Ely, The Fate of the State Guaranty Funds After the Advent of 
Federal Insurance Chartering, in OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGU-
LATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 135, 137–38. 
 325. See id.  
 326. See id. 
 327. Although it is easier to charge firms for the actual costs of insolvencies 
in a post-assessment scheme, insurers that embrace a risky strategy may dis-
count this cost based on the prospect that they will be the firm that becomes 
insolvent. 
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setting appropriate ex ante premiums in such circumstances.328 
One alternative is to require insurers to issue bonds that essen-
tially mimic state guarantee funds. Because the price of these 
bonds would reflect market estimates of the expected costs of 
guarantee fund payments, they would do a better job of setting 
prices correctly than a state-set premium.  
Unfortunately, neither guarantee funds nor market-based 
substitutes are likely to improve regulatory competition. In 
both an OFC and an SLS scheme, the key problem is that 
guarantee funds would either be unstable or would be poorly 
designed. Moreover, market-based substitutes for guarantee 
funds would be practically unworkable. 
1. Guarantee Funds and the OFC 
There are three basic ways that such guarantee funds 
could be structured in an OFC scheme.329 First, an exclusive 
federal guarantee system would require all insurers, irrespec-
tive of whether they opted for state or federal regulation, to 
participate in a new federal guarantee fund. This approach 
would replicate the FDIC scheme in banking.330 Second, an ex-
clusive state guarantee system would retain the current scheme 
of state-provided guarantee funds and require that all insurers 
opting for a federal charter continue their participation in these 
state guarantee funds. This would maintain the status quo ap-
proach despite the addition of a federal option. Finally, a dual 
guarantee system would require insurers that opted for a feder-
al charter to participate in a new federal guarantee fund, but 
mandate that insurers regulated at the state level continue 
their participation in state funds.  
Neither of the first two options—an exclusive federal guar-
antee system or an exclusive state guarantee system—would 
effectively discipline regulatory competition. First, neither of 
 
 328. See David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to Meet 
the Practice, in PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 1, 34 (Robert E. Litan & Ri-
chard Herring eds., 2004) (“A common but troubling phenomenon is severe 
underpricing of risk coverage by the public sector, often because premiums are 
insufficiently responsive to risk differentials. . . . When politics and political 
pressures intrude, it is often impossible to impose significant differential rates 
for insurance.”). 
 329. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 89–91 (providing an overview of 
guarantee funds and how they could be adjusted in an OFC scheme so as not 
to sever the link between regulation and guarantee, which operates as a prod-
uct warranty). See generally Ely, supra note 324. 
 330. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 310–15, 326. 
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these schemes would improve regulatory supply by acting as an 
effective product warranty. The basic problem with both 
schemes is that they would require one of the two suppliers of 
regulation to provide a warranty not just for its own regulation, 
but also for the solvency regulation of the other scheme. This 
would accomplish precisely the opposite goal of the guarantee 
fund as a product warranty, creating a moral hazard for which-
ever regulatory scheme did not supply the guarantee fund.331 
Indeed, commentators have argued that an analogous mis-
match between deposit insurance and banking regulation (the 
FDIC insures even state-chartered banks) induces excessively 
lax safety and soundness regulation at the state level.332 
Second, neither an exclusive state or federal guarantee scheme 
would improve regulatory demand. Both approaches would sev-
er the link between an insurer’s responsibility for funding 
guarantees and its selection among competing regulators. As a 
result, insurers would disregard their expected contributions to 
guarantee funds in choosing among competing regulators.  
By contrast, while the third option of a dual guarantee sys-
tem is theoretically attractive, it is practically unworkable. In 
theory, a dual guarantee system could promote effective regula-
tory competition with respect to solvency regulation: it might 
force regulators to provide a “warranty” for their solvency regu-
lation and it would attempt to tether insurers’ regulatory choices 
to their responsibility to pay guarantee fund costs. Unfortu-
nately, the state guarantee funds in a dual guarantee scheme 
would be unreliable. First, the separate existence of a federal 
guarantee scheme would inherently raise the prospect that the 
federal government would bail out state guarantee funds that 
were unable to pay their claims. Indeed, this is exactly what 
happened historically in the banking context, with state deposit 
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insurance funds consistently failing and requiring federal bail-
outs.333 Second, state-licensed insurers would inevitably resist 
paying postassessment fees to fund guarantee fund payments. 
The key problem, from the perspective of state-licensed insur-
ers, would be that they would not be able to pass these costs on 
to consumers (as in the status quo) because federally chartered 
insurers operating in the state, against whom they compete, 
would not be obliged to pay these assessments. Third, the num-
ber of insurers that would be available to tax on a post-
assessment basis would be variable, changing as state-licensed 
insurers shifted their charter to the federal level. A state that 
insisted on postassessment funding would thus have substan-
tially less certainty than in the status quo about how much it 
would need to assess insurers in order to fund guaranteed 
payments.  
2. Guarantee Funds, the SLS, and Solvency Bonds 
The only sensible way to structure guarantee funds in an 
SLS scheme of regulatory competition would be to require 
every state that issues charters to provide a financial guaran-
tee for those insurers, irrespective of where policyholders are 
located. This approach to guarantee funds would maintain the 
link between regulation and the guarantee fund that is critical 
to the notion of a guarantee system as a warranty. But it would 
be even less reliable than state guarantee funds in an OFC 
scheme. The key problem is that a single state could be on the 
hook for all of the losses associated with an insolvency, and it 
could only look to the insurers chartered in its state (as opposed 
to those who are licensed to do business in the state) to help 
pay for the costs of that insolvency. In most cases, states will 
simply be unable or unwilling to raise the funds to pay for such 
guarantees, especially if they are large. 
Recognizing this limitation of state guarantee funds in an 
SLS scheme, proponents of the SLS have proposed that insur-
ers could be required to issue “solvency bonds,” which are a 
specific type of risk-linked security.334 Solvency bonds would be 
sold to investors in capital markets.335 In the event that the 
guarantee fund of the insurer’s selected state regulator failed, 
the investors’ principal would be used to make up for the state 
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guarantee fund’s default.336 If, on the other hand, the guaran-
tee fund of the insurer’s chosen regulator did not default within 
the bond’s time period, then investors’ principal would be re-
turned.337 In exchange for taking on the risk of losing their 
principal, investors would be compensated by market-
determined rates of return.338 The key idea behind this propos-
al is that the rate of return that investors demanded would re-
flect the risk that a state’s guarantee fund would fail.339 This, 
in turn, would lead insurers to seek out state regulators whose 
guarantee funds were unlikely to fail because they maintain ef-
fective solvency regulation.340 Doing so would reduce the rate 
that insurers would need to pay on these bonds.341  
Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that capital markets 
would have anywhere near a sufficient appetite for purchasing 
these solvency bonds at a reasonable rate of return. The most 
natural comparison to a solvency bond is a catastrophe bond, 
which is also a risk-linked bond. A catastrophe bond is a rein-
surance substitute for insurers.342 Catastrophe bonds are vir-
tually identical to solvency bonds, except that the triggering 
event for payout of investors’ principal is based on some meas-
ure of the size of insured losses from a single event.343 Catas-
trophe bonds were first introduced into the marketplace in the 
mid-1990s. Since then, insurers have often had difficulty find-
ing investors willing to purchase these bonds.344 Prior to 2004, 
no more than nine catastrophe bonds have been issued in a giv-
en year. In recent years, these numbers have increased sub-
stantially. Yet even in 2007, which saw a record number of new 
issuances of catastrophe bonds, only twenty-nine bonds were 
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issued.345 In 2008, the number of new issues fell dramatically to 
only eleven, though it appears that that number rebounded in 
2009.346 In sum, the catastrophe bond market evolved slowly, 
over more than a decade, and remains cyclical.347 The reason, 
most agree, is due to uneven investor interest in these instru-
ments.  
This slowly evolving interest in catastrophe bonds may, at 
first glance, signal that a robust market for solvency bonds 
could emerge over time, as investors familiarized themselves 
with these bonds and their components became relatively stan-
dardized. But this would be a mistake. Solvency bonds are, in 
fact, likely to prove much less enticing to investors than catas-
trophe bonds. First, and most importantly, the key selling point 
of catastrophe bonds for investors is that the triggering event is 
not linked to market risk: whether a hurricane hits Florida has 
nothing to do with the performance of the Dow in the present 
year.348 This makes catastrophe bonds a good diversification 
mechanism, which is important given that these bonds (like 
solvency bonds) place the investors’ entire principal at risk for 
a contractually specified period of time.349  
By contrast, investor risk in solvency bonds would mani-
festly not be independent of market conditions. Market condi-
tions correlate very well with the risk of insurer insolvency, as 
insurers make a large percentage of their money from investing 
the floats on their premiums.350 Insurer insolvencies are conse-
quently much more likely when the market is performing poor-
ly.351 And this means that the failure of a state’s guarantee 
fund, which would need to pay policyholders of a failed insurer, 
would also be clearly linked to overall market conditions. Com-
pleting the reasoning, the payout on solvency bonds would also 
be correlated to market risk. As a result, solvency bonds are 
likely to be much less attractive to investors than catastrophe 
bonds. 
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An additional reason that investors are unlikely to have 
much interest in solvency bonds is that they present a substan-
tial amount of moral hazard. A key component of catastrophe 
bonds is that the triggering event and the requisite payout 
cannot be influenced by the actions of the issuer. Thus, most 
catastrophe bonds base payouts on indices that are not general-
ly impacted by the particular issuer’s payouts in the event of a 
catastrophe.352 By contrast, solvency bonds would undoubtedly 
involve a great degree of moral hazard that could not be con-
tracted away. The key problem is that states would be more in-
clined to default on their guarantee fund obligations—
especially in the event of a large loss—if they knew that inves-
tors in solvency bonds would pick up the tab. Although this 
might limit their capacity to compete in the market to attract 
insurers in the future, that may appear to be a small price to 
pay in exchange for allowing anonymous investors, rather than 
state taxpayers, to pay out-of-state policyholders of failed in-
surers.  
There are over ten thousand insurers in the United 
States.353 After a decade, the catastrophe bond market—which 
enjoys massive advantages over solvency bonds from an inves-
tor demand standpoint—has managed to produce about thirty 
bond issuances a year.354 These issuances have been from only 
the largest national and international insurers.355 As these 
numbers suggest, requiring all insurers to issue solvency bonds 
is simply unworkable.  
  CONCLUSION   
Any fair evaluation of the present state-based system of in-
surance regulation must acknowledge that there continue to be 
substantial inefficiencies in the regulatory process. Appropriate 
reform could substantially improve this regulatory system, and 
thus enhance the efficiency and fairness of insurance markets. 
But this Article has raised substantial doubts about whether 
reforms that enhance regulatory competition would achieve 
this outcome. In particular, it has argued that regulatory com-
petition would ultimately undermine the content of insurance 
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law and regulation, harming consumers, third parties, and in-
surers themselves.  
To be sure, this Article’s scope is limited, and it does not 
analyze several important issues that are relevant to the 
broader insurance regulatory reform debate. In particular, it 
does not consider the duplicative and overlapping nature of 
state insurance regulation. Although the extent of this problem 
is debatable,356 those inclined to believe it is large may con-
clude that the benefits of a scheme such as the OFC, which al-
low insurers to select a single regulator and only creates lim-
ited regulatory competition, outweigh the costs identified 
herein.  
However, this framing presents a false choice. Various re-
forms would limit the duplicative nature of state insurance 
regulation while avoiding enhanced regulatory competition. 
These include proposals to create a single federal insurance 
regulator, to empower a federal agency to coordinate state reg-
ulation, or to require that all multistate insurers be subject to 
national regulation.357 Reform-minded scholars and advocates 
should focus their efforts on these options rather than embrac-
ing regulatory competition in insurance.  
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